The re-innovation of Ford Motor Company to a sustainable lean enterprise. by Ryan, Kenneth A., 1968-
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
8-2006 
The re-innovation of Ford Motor Company to a sustainable lean 
enterprise. 
Kenneth A. Ryan 1968- 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan, Kenneth A. 1968-, "The re-innovation of Ford Motor Company to a sustainable lean enterprise." 
(2006). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1243. 
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1243 
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator 
of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who 
has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
THE RE-INNOVATION OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY TO A SUSTAINABLE LEAN 
ENTERPRISE 
By 
Kenneth A. Ryan 
B.S.A.E., St. Louis University, 1990 
B.S.M.E., University of Missouri, 1991 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
University of Louisville 
J.B. Speed School of Engineering 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Professional Degree 
Master of Engineering 













Submitted by:          















by the following Reading and Examination Committee: 
 
 
         
Surja Alexander, PhD., P.E., Thesis Director 
 
 
         
William Biles, PhD., P.E., Faculty Advisor 
 
 
         
John S. Usher PhD., P.E., Chair Industrial Engineering Department 
 
 
         
Adel Elmagrabhy PhD., P.E., Chair Computer Science & Engineering 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my very beautiful wife, Holly, and our three children: Jacob, Nicholas, 
and Kate for putting up with all the anguish and time I spent away from home in class or 
studying. Holly's dedication and commitment to the family and exercising incredible 
leadership as CINCF AM (Commander-In-Chief of Family) was the biggest asset in helping me 
complete this thesis. 
A very special thanks goes out to my curriculum advisor and class professor, Dr. Bill Biles, 
who taught me to think about a problem from a bigger more macro view than the discreet set 
of values that most engineers strive to obtain. More special thanks to Dr. John Usher, who 
helped push me into going the thesis route. Let's see how Dr. Usher worded this 
(paraphrasing), 'You can take a three hour class and do a project worth three hours and it will 
take you about ~ 150 man hours to complete, or you can go the thesis route and you can get 
done with about ~120 man hours.' Now, that might not be the correct words, but the story is 
there - go the thesis route, it'll take you less time. It didn't quite work out that way, and I'm 
glad. I spent more time trying to understand the Big Picture of how the automotive industry 
works from industry leader, Toyota, and learned more than a class and project would have 
taught me. 
Though I've regretted going this route at times and not taking what I perceived as the easier 
route (class and project), I was spurred on by endeavoring questions from my thesis advisor, 
Dr. Suraj Alexander. I gready appreciated Dr. Alexander slogging through the readings of my 
thesis and keeping me grounded to using detailed examples and sound engineering principles. 
Without Dr. Alexander's perspective, this thesis would not have been as complete. 
I gready appreciated Dr. Hdel Elmagrabhy, for being a part of my thesis committee and 
bringing a very special point of view to never forget the environmental impact of 
manufacturing. Combined with Dr. Biles, they gave me the impetus for me to learn and 
understand Environmental Benign Manufacturing and how it applies to the auto industry. 
In conclusion, I thank the University of Louisville for the outstanding Professors I've met 
along the way, and the great course curriculum assembled to achieve this master's degree. 
tv 
ABSTRACT 
THE RE-INNOVATIO:\l OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY TO A SUSTAINABLE LEAN 
ENTERPRISE 
For many years the concept of Lean Manufacturing has been applied in automotive 
development as a tool to refIne the manufacturing practices to the greatest efflciency possible 
through waste reduction. Continuous Improvement is a quality innovation process that 
supports this objective, based on the manufacturing pillar - work processes and scientifIc 
experiments must be controlled and constantly modifIed and improved by the people who do, 
and are accountable for the work. Continuous Improvement implicitly implies the 
understanding and recognition of what is a problem and problem solving techniques used to 
formulate the best countermeasures to those problems. 
The process of Lean Manufacturing embraces a philosophy of excellence, elimination of waste 
on value-added operations, employee involvement, and continuous improvement. It is a 
journey, an on-going process that results in improved customer satisfaction and hence 
corporate profIts. ProfIt is the reward for customer satisfaction. Increase customer 
satisfaction and your rewards are higher profIts. This is the best method to maintain or 
increase market share. Understanding the basic hierarchy and philosophy of how to increase 
profIts is essential to creating a sustainable lean enterprise. The following structured process 
outlines the basic questions and answers for any company to ask itself: 
v 
Process to Sustained Success 
Questions: 
Why are we here? 
How do we improve our 
business bottom line? 
How do we give our 
customers what they 
want? 
Every problem is a 
deviation from a 
standard! 
How do we and our 
suppliers achieve 










To Make Money! 
Give the customer the products 
they want with the quality they 
expect. 
To give the customers what they 
want and expect, we must identify 
and understand variations in our 
processes and parts. 
Strict adherence to process 
standards promotes structured 
problem solving and identification 
of variations. 
Level production schedule allows 
us and our suppliers to achieve 
production process stability. 
This thesis is about Ford Motor Company getting back to its roots, the heritage it started with 
the development of the moving assembly line and the original concept of Lean Manufacturing. 
This paper will focus on the creative steps outlined in the Process to Sustained Success 
procedure toward the journey of Lean Manufacturing. In addition, the current state of 
production processes, and recommended specific corrective actions for the re-innovation of 
Ford Motor Company to a sustained lean enterprise in a modern era will be discussed. 
Questions will be asked and answered such as: Can Ford achieve sustained success 
implementing "The Way Forward" plan, or does "The Way Forward" [16] plan need to 
incorporate the Process to Sustained Success to meet Ford's long-term goals? The 
benchmark company for comparison is Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corporation. 
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Chapter I: Uncle Henry's Company 
Introduction 
A - History of Manufacturing at Ford Motor Company: 
"That line established the efficiency of the method," Henry Ford said regarding the moving 
automobile assembly line. [1] The idea of moving the work to the man reached its zenith on 
October 17, 1913 at the Highland Park final assembly line when the Ford rigged a chassis that 
was slowly pulled across the factory floor by rope and windlass. Parts, components, and 140 
assemblers were stationed at different intervals along the 150-foot line. As the winch literally 
dragged the chassis across the floor, workers attached parts to the vehicle. When the first car 
was finished, production men were amazed at the time saved. Rather than twelve and a half 
hours to build a single car, they had performed the feat in five hours and fifty minutes. [2] 
Henry Ford first latched onto the concept that instead of bringing the man to the work, as cars 
were built in stationary cells at the time, work must be brought to the man. He initially used 
cradles that were pushed from one workstation to the next. A breakthrough came early in 1913 
when a production engineer in the flywheel magneto assembly area tried a new way to put the 
component's parts together. The operation was divided into twenty-nine steps and workers 
were instructed to place only one part in the assembly line before pushing the flywheel down 
the line to the next assembler. The assembly time was reduced from about twenty minutes to 
five minutes per flywheel. This strategy was applied to the construction of the engine and 
finally the entire vehicle. [3] 
The moving assembly line is only possible through the early inventions of luminaries such as 
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Eli Whitney. In the early years of the USA, there was a severe shortage of skilled machinists. 
Whitney realized that by using a template, workers with little skill could not only operate 
machines, but also produce identical parts that were interchangeable. 
Until then, under the English system invented during the Industrial Revolution, skilled 
machinists were required to produce parts from a design. But however skilled the machinist, 
parts were never identical, and each part had to be manufactured separately to fit its 
counterpart - almost always by one person who produced each completed item from start to 
finish. 
Although there was still a requirement for the craftsmen to create prototypes of the design 
before production, they were no longer required in the actual manufacturing. Whitney first 
used the system to manufacture muskets. Such was his reputation that the U.S. government 
gave him a contract for 10,000 muskets, to be produced within two years, even though he had 
no factory or machines. It actually took eight years to deliver the order, as Whitney perfected 
and developed new techniques and machines, but he did go on to produce a further 15,000 
muskets within the following two years. 
Due to the concept of identical and interchangeable parts, Ford's constant revision and 
improvements to make a single car drove the build time to only ninety-three minutes in 1914. 
The results were immediate and extraordinary allowing Ford Motor Company to produce more 
vehicles than all other automakers combined. Benefiting the customer the price for each Model 
T Ford dropped from $600 in 1912 to $360 in 1916. "The perfection of the moving assembly 
line is Ford's greatest gift to history," says Don Werling, former historical director of the Henry 
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Ford Estate, Fair Lane, at the University of Michigan - Dearborn, and founder of the Henry 
Ford Heritage Association. [4] 
But the great gift Henry Ford gave the world was much more than a moving assembly line - it 
was the birth of Lean Manufacturing backed by the splendid notion of continuous 
improvement utilizing scientific testing and evaluations - hypotheses created to test the 
improved developments of the assembly line. Henry Ford's team investigated new ways to 
improve manufacturing techniques and flexibility. At the Rouge complex during the times after 
the stock market crash of 28 October 1929 Ford Motor Company survived through a mix of 
cost-cutting initiatives, price reductions, and higher wages, which Henry correctly surmised 
would sell more cars. In the process, he earmarked $25 million for factory expansions and 
improvements making the plant flexible enough to manufacture tractors, automobiles, and a 
range of other vehicles using "vertical integration" manufacturing techniques. Henry Ford's 
spirit to improve efficiency and reduce production costs kept Ford Motor Company alive and 
well during the hard times of the Depression. Among the top manufacturing innovations 
during the Depression was the introduction of the one-piece cast V8 block by Ford. [5] 
Business for Ford Motor Company trundled along during the 1930's until February 10, 1942 
when by decree from the U.S. government that all civilian Ford automobile production cease 
and the company's immense manufacturing facilities in Michigan and other states were brought 
under the control of the War Production Board. "The same assembly line that made Ford 
automobiles is now to be used for jeeps and staff cars for army officers," the press reported. [6] 
Ford Motor Company poured its energies into the tools of war. Led by Henry Ford, seventy-
eight at the time, said to have "rolled up both sleeves" for the war effort. Henry took a track of 
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land near Ypsilanti, MI called Willow Run, and ordered a mile long L-shaped plant built to 
produce B-24 Liberator bombers for the military. By 1945, Henry had his production line so 
efficient 70% of all B-24 bombers were made at Willow Run - no small feat given that Boeing 
Co. was a dedicated aircraft manufacturer. The company also excelled at producing M-4 tanks, 
parts, and engines; armored and reconnaissance cars; amphibious craft; swamp buggies; and a 
wealth of other war materiel. 
Unfortunately during this time of war, Edsel, Henry's son and president of Ford Motor 
Company died on 26 May 1943. Henry, almost eighty years of age, resumed the tide as 
president of the company. Edsel's eldest son, Henry Ford II - the "Deuce", a Naval 
Lieutenant, was released from service to go back to Ford Motor Company, learn the ropes, and 
eventually take over command. Henry made the "Deuce" president of the company on 21 
September 1945 at only twenty-eight years old. 
The company ran with the "Deuce" at the controls with Henry looking on every so often until 
Henry's death on 7 April 1947. By this time, Ford Motor Company was beleaguered by an 
inferior management system and other more serious problems, which Henry II tackled with 
fervor. The revitalized company met the postwar economic boom with a new Ford Division 
and a new car - the 1949 Ford, the first change in a Ford body since 1942 and the first change 
in a chassis since 1932. 
Times were changing for the United States with America's sudden postwar prosperity made a 
brand-new car an attainable dream for millions. Many middle-class families had the financial 
wherewithal to buy a second car. The 1950s liberated the automobile from its early utilitarian 
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bonds to soar into the futuristic visions mirroring the optimism of the nation. The people who 
grew up during the Depression, fought in WWII, and now figured they deserved the big two-
tone car with the huge V -8 engine, automatic transmission, and a boat load of chrome - big 
cars that reflected big dreams. Attentions of the automotive manufacturers turned to designing 
the cars people wanted - stylistic cars. 
In 1955, Ford Motor Company explored an uncharted market and came up with a winner in 
the new Thunderbird. The company broke all previous sales records and the "Deuce" was 
named Time magazine's "Marketing Man of the Year." The next year President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower signed into legislation the Interstate Highway Act earmarking public funds to build 
a national grid of highways. Americans took to the roads in record numbers fueling an 
economic boom through the early 1960s. 
During the early 1960s, then President John F. Kennedy vowed America would be the first to 
the moon, and the spirit of the space age captured the automotive manufacturers' and 
consumers'imaginations. Ford led with three new cars, the 1959 Galaxie, the company's new 
top-line series; the 1960 Mercury Comet, its first principle upscale compact car; the 1960 Ford 
Falcon, and the 1962 Meteor. The car that took America's heart was introduced on 17 April 
1964 at the New York World's Fair - the Mustang. More than a million Mustangs would be 
produced before its second birthday. [7] 
The winds of change were blowing though. Fun and frivolity of the 1950s and early 1960s gave 
way to demands for stricter government controls on automobile hydrocarbon emissions. In 
1964, California was the first state to mandate reduced amounts of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, 
and lead in car exhaust. The following year, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution and Control Act 
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of 1965 applied the California regulations to the entire country. More anti-smog rules were 
issued, such as the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970, which imposed a reduction of almost 90% in 
vehicle emissions. More challenges were on the way for the automotive manufacturers. In a 
speech to Ford's worldwide managers in February 1973, Henry II predicted the environment 
rules would become more restrictive as the public pressure increased. He also predicted 
another looming crisis - a major oil shortage. Later that year an embargo by OPEC proved 
him right. Ford quickly put its great might behind the small subcompact car introduced in 
1971, the Pinto. 
More governmental restrictions followed making the automobile industry responsible for 
energy conservation. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 instituted Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) guidelines requiring automakers to consistently improve their 
vehicle's mpg metrics. Meeting these standards would not be easy for the American 
automotive manufacturers who are accustomed to building large vehicles. "American 
carmakers didn't want to make smallish Falcons and Valiants; they wanted to make full-size 
Buicks and Fords," says Robert Casey, Curator of Transportation at Henry Ford Museum and 
Greenfield Village. "It was pure economics: It didn't cost much more to make a full-size Ford 
than it did to make a Falcon, but you could sell the Ford for a lot more money." [8] 
But in 1978 a second oil crisis occurred and this time Japanese companies were well positioned 
to take advantage of the consumer desire for smaller more fuel-efficient cars that were 
dependable and affordable. Complicating matters here in the United States was a favorable 
dollar-to-yen ratio, substantially lower labor costs in Japan, and soaring interest rates here in the 
u.s. 
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The outlook for Ford was grim. The company's U.S. sales in 1980 were half the volume of 
1978. Its market share fell from 23 percent in 1977 to 17.3 percent in 1980, a year in which it 
lost a staggering $1.5 billion. "Can Ford Keep Up?" was the headline on the 15 October 1979 
cover of t'orbeJ magazine. This decline eventually reached 16.6 percent market share in 1981, 
lowest in history. Owner loyalty also deteriorated - to 35 percent in 1981 as well. Between 
1980 and 1982, the company lost $3.3 billion - a staggering 43 percent of Ford's net worth. 
A difficult task lay ahead of cost management. Red Poling was given this task and in short 
order he pulled one million units from production (getting back to a Lean Manufacturing 
principle - waste due to over-production), laid off some 60,000 Ford employees (reducing 
payroll expenses from $6.2 billion to $5.2 billion), and closed five plants (saving another $500 
million). At the same time and harking back to the days of Henry Ford in the early 1930s, Ford 
spent $14 billion between 1980 and 1984 on plant improvements, new products, processes, 
machinery, and equipment and another $9 billion on research and development. 
Red Poling explained that quality had to improve and only those plants that understood this 
objective would remain open. Poling also confided that the difference between Ford and its 
Japanese competitors was not the quality of workers but Ford's inferior management 
philosophy, which did not emphasize continuous improvements in product quality. This 
statement will become more prophetic in the next twenty years as Japanese manufacturers gain 
a majority of the world market share, and take over the leaders of market share in the U.S. with 
ever increasing profits. 
"Quality is Job 1" now permeated the culture at Ford facilities all over the world. By the first 
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quarter of 1983, Ford was profitable both at home and overseas for the first time in the past 
sixteen quarters; by the end of the year, Ford was the car sales leader in all of Europe for the 
first time in its history. The hard work and benefits were starting to payoff and a new ground 
breaking design was on the board, the new Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable. Ford had 
undertaken long-term planning of a kind never before seen in the automobile industry. The 
Taurus team contracted outside experts in ergonomics, insurance, and car repair to offer their 
specialized advice and criticism, of which many they implemented. Ford engineers literally tore 
apart hundreds of cars sold by competitors, a process called "reverse engineering," to learn 
others' best practices firsthand. The team brought the program in under budget realizing an 
impressive 11 percent return on investment. The company's pretax earnings in 1986 were 
better than GM's for the first time since 1924, and the next year, Ford's stock price climbed an 
astonishing 76 percent from its 1986 high. 
In the mid-1980s, Ford continued to evolve, embarking on an ambitious agenda to acquire 
large fmancial services companies. Its objective was twofold: to offset the cyclical nature of the 
automotive business and to provide Ford's customer base with a broad range of financial 
services products. By the year 2000, outside tiers of suppliers now contributed the lion's share 
of parts used in Ford vehicles. In 1995, the head of Ford Motor Company, Alex Trotman, 
adopted another endeavor, to cut costs, boost productivity, and grow the bottom line - Ford 
2000. 
The Ford 2000 strategy is to have global product teams create cars that would be sold around 
the world, thereby reducing waste and duplication of effort. A more efficient, leaner company 
would result and provide more autonomy to branch managers. The goal of a more nimble 
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international company embracing teamwork, new technology, and a worldwide outlook - one 
far less bureaucratic and insular - remained the same. A new CEO of Ford,Jac Nasser, put the 
Ford 2000 initiative aside in favor of a new strategy, BLI - Business Leadership Initiative. 
The latest initiative to make the rounds at Ford Motor Company is "Way Forward". "Way 
Forward" is an innovation initiative to set the direction of Ford Motor Company onto a 
profitable path. According to William Clay Ford, Jr., CEO of Ford Motor Company, 
"Innovation is going to be the compass by which this Company sets its direction. Innovative 
answers need to be found for every aspect of our business, from product development and 
manufacturing to human resources and finance. Not everyone will have the ideas that we need, 
but everyone can support and help implement needed innovation." [9] 
Why such an exhausting description of Ford Motor Company's history? To point out the fact 
that since 1932, there has been no significant innovation or invention in manufacturing for 
Ford Motor Company. Henry Ford was the last true leader at Ford who fully understood 
manufacturing and the principles of efficiency that would later become known as, "Lean 
Manufacturing". The following is an excerpt regarding Henry's amazing consciousness of 
manufacturing principles: 
"Henry fought back with another new car, the pioneering Ford V-8, introduced in 1932. Other 
carmakers had made eight-cylinder engines before, but they were heavy and expensive, causing 
many to focus instead on six-cylinder engines. Henry disliked six-cylinder motors and always 
insisted that engines should be made only with four, eight, or sixteen cylinders. Once, upon 
hearing that his engineers had devised a six-cylinder engine without his knowledge, he was so 
- 9 -
infuriated that he took an axe to it. 
Henry had a better idea - a one-piece V8 engine block that would be lighter in weight and less 
expensive to make. There was only one hitch: the casting technology to manufacture a single 
V8 engine didn't exist. That didn't stop Henry. He and a group of handpicked engineers set 
up shop in 1931 in Thomas Edison's old Fort Myers laboratory, which had been moved to the 
grounds of Greenfield Village in Dearborn, to find the solutions. 
"Mr. Ford kept everybody away from [the project]," Emil Zoerlin, and electrical engineer on 
the project, said in his reminiscences. "As far as I know, Charlie Sorensen didn't know about it, 
[and] I don't know whether Edsel was aware. The original concept of the V8 was Mr. Ford's. 
[He] came in two or three times a day [and] was vitally interested in a one-piece casting of the 
cylinder block. It had to be one-piece, defmitely." [10] 
As Henry Ford was getting up in years, he started to turn control of Ford Motor Company over 
to his son, and later his grandson, Henry Ford II. But none of them could match Henry's 
prowess of manufacturing principles. In 1946 manufacturing gave way to "Modern Business 
Strategies" as the Deuce, Henry Ford II, hired 10 former USAAF officers, nick-named the 
"Whiz Kids", who would bring principles of modern management to the company. Thus was 
lost the emphasis on efficient manufacturing techniques and reduction of waste efforts. 
General Ford Corporate Tirneline: Appendix A 
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B - What is Lean Manufacturing? 
"Save ten steps a day for each of twelve thousand employees," Henry [Ford] said, "and you 
will have saved fifty miles of wasted motion and misspent energy." [11] 
When you ask, "What is the Toyota Production System?" 80 percent of people will answer "A 
Kanban System", 15 percent will answer "A production system", and only 5 percent who 
understand the basic principle will answer "A system for the absolute elimination of waste." 
(Shingo, 1989) [12] 
The Toyota Production System (TPS) is generally accepted as the basis for manufacturing 
principles known as Lean Manufacturing. Therefore, this thesis will concentrate most on TPS 
as a guide to Lean Manufacturing and a comparison to Ford Motor Company. However, 
understanding the basic philosophy of TPS is central to understanding what Lean 
Manufacturing is all about. This thesis uses TPS and Lean Manufacturing synonymously 
though there are some differences. 
Lean manufacturing embraces a philosophy of excellence that includes the elimination of 
waste or non-value-added activities while adjusting the production flow of the product 
according to customer demand. 
It uses the building blocks of: standardized work, workplace organization, visual controls, 
effective plant layout, and quality at the source, batch reduction, teams, customer demand-
based manufacturing, point-of-use storage, quick changeover (SMED), one-piece flow, cellular 
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manufacturing, and takt time. 
Lean manufacturing also applies the modern elements and technologies of scrap reduction, 
process improvements in machining and tool selection as well as material selection, set-up 
reduction, Just-In-Time, Kaizan, world-class manufacturing, synchronous manufacturing, and 
inventory management. 
In a paper prepared by The Kentucky Way partnership between the University of Kentucky 
and Toyota, the group outlines "The Lean Organization": [13] 
The lean organization ... 
1 Designs its products and aligns every step in its operations to create the highest value 
for its customers. 
2 Truly believes its people are its most important asset and creates a work environment 
that promotes respect, job satisfaction and meaningful contribution. 
3 Is simultaneously stable and flexible. 
4 Flows work so that problems are immediately visible and then has systems in place to 
fix them fast and permanendy. 
5 Assesses costs accurately, fully recognizing systems and lifecycle impacts of decisions. 
6 Distributes power across the organization but maintains strategic focus and control 
through clear charters of responsibility, defmition of organizational roles, and 
communication of appropriate organizational goals. 
7 Relies on an evolutional use of standards to rapidly improve its methodologies, role 
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definitions, and policy effectiveness while maintaining high levels of control. 
8 Builds control into the system through structural simplification and does not succumb 
to the false promises of superimposed control through information systems. 
9 Is skillful at using the key tools such as visual controls, standardized work, mistake 
proofmg, and setup reduction, but knows that these exist simply to create the requisite 
structure and sustain control of lean operations; they are not at the heart of lean 
production. 
10 Engages everyone as a knowledge worker and employs the lean work system -- a 
sophisticated system involving local work ownership and empowerment, strategic 
work focus, evolutionary standards, and learning-focused improvement strategies -- to 
rapidly kaizen methodologies for tremendous gains in efficiency, quality, and control. 
11 Uses appropriate accounting and performance measurement systems that provide 
rapid feedback, motivates true system-level performance improvement, maintain 
appropriate focus on the long term, and take advantage of the control that exists 
through simplification of the system. 
12 Relies on managers who know the work, who are in touch with the work through 
direct presence and keen observation, who get their hands dirty, who support the 
work, who develop their people, and have learned how to lead their teams. 
13 Recognizes that competition occurs at the level of the extended-enterprise value 
stream and builds that value stream through strong partnerships with its suppliers and 
customers. 
14 Is good, good to its customers, good to its people, and good to society. It ends up 
being very highly rewarded for that. 
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The Toyota Production System evolved from the historic manufacturing system developed by 
Henry Ford. Among the distinguishing elements of Ford's system, all of which still can be 
seen today in any modern automobile plant: 
1 A conveyor belt - work came to the workers. 
2 Division of labor - workers handled only single steps in the assembly sequence. 
3 Integrated supply chain - Ford kept each process in the production sequence supplied 
with all the parts and materials needed in the process. 
A passage from the Toyota Motor Manufacturing employee's handbook, "The Toyota 
Production System": 
"Henry Ford's manufacturing system thus provided the historical and technological 
foundations for the Toyota Production System. But circumstances in Japan provided the 
opportunity for some crucial improvements on Ford's system. 
To begin with, production volumes in postwar Japan were miniscule compared with 
automotive output in the West. Those small production volumes did not allow Japanese 
automakers the luxury of using specialized equipment for each model. Nor did they allow for 
stocking huge inventories of parts. 
Automakers in Japan thus needed to develop flexible methods for adapting the same machines 
to different vehicle models. And they needed to fInd ways to ensure reliable supplies of 
needed parts and materials without maintaining big inventories." [14] 
What are the Toyota Production System's cornerstone ideologies? 
1 Just-In-Time (JIT) production 
o Doing it all for the Customer 
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o Leveled production 
o Pull system 
o Continuous-flow processing 
o Takt time 
o Multi-skilled operators 
2 Jidoka 
o Building Quality into the production process 
3 Standardized Work and Kaizen 
o Standardized Work: the Basis for Kaizen 
o Kaizen: the Lifeblood of Standardized Work 
Within this thesis rhetoric of the Introduction, Lean Manufacturing is fIrst and above all about 
the recognition and reduction of wastes typically viewed as - Over Production, Over 
Processing, Inventory, Waiting, Correction, Conveyance, and Motion. The starting line of 
Lean Manufacturing is not always obvious to most engineers and managers alike, but Lean 
principles start with the customer base. 
C - A New Vision for Ford Motor Company - The Way Forward Plan 
Announced on 23 January 2006, William Clay Ford, Jr. introduced the new President of the 
Americas, Mark Fields, and Mr. Fields' new direction to right the failing company. The plan 
Mr. Fields introduced: "The Way Forward". 
According to Mark Fields, the success of Ford Motor Company hinges on three priorities: 
1 Creating a team that knows how to win 
- 15 -
2 Developing a Way Forward plan that shows us how to win 
3 Developing with speed to help us win quickly 
Figure 1- The Way Forward Plan 
The complete announcement is listed in Appendix B. 
Summary of the Way Forward plan: 
Comprehensive North American "Way Forward" plan focuses every part of the business on 
the customer - to build stronger Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brands, a strengthened product 
lineup and far greater quality, competitive costs and improved productivity. 
• Product investments will result in new vehicles in new segments to reach more 
customers - including small cars and more crossovers - while maintaining Ford's truck 
leadership. 
• Ford is committed to stabilizing its U.S. market share in the near term. 
• Competitive cost structure includes net material cost reductions of at least $6 billion by 
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2010. 
• Productivity improvements leverage the company's global product development scale 
and lean and flexible manufacturing system to introduce more products faster. 
• Straight forward vehicle pricing will continue to be introduced with new models. 
• North American capacity is realigned to match demand - with 14 manufacturing 
facilities to be idled - resulting in significant cost savings and reduced employment of 
25,000-30,000. 
• Salary-related costs are being cut 10 percent in North America with the previously 
announced reduction of the equivalent of 4,000 salaried positions by the end of the 
first quarter. In addition, the company's officer ranks are being reduced 12 percent by 
the end of the first quarter. 
• Ford is planning a new low-cost manufacturing site for the future. 
• North American automotive profitability is achieved no later than 2008. 
• Beginning in 2006, Ford Motor Company will no longer provide earnings guidance-
to keep the company and investors focused on one goal: sustainable profitability over 
time in all regions. 
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D - Problem Statement: 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a unique philosophy and structure as given in the 
"Process to Sustained Success" diagram to form the basis for re-innovating Ford Motor 
Company to continued profitability and continuous improvement. 
This thesis doesn't intend to address every detail of Lean Manufacturing concepts and the 
application of specific techniques toward Ford Motor Company's manufacturing processes, 
but to develop the mindset and philosophy needed to confront the brutal reality that Ford's 
manufacturing and product development systems need to evolve from its heritage. 
Through out the historical review of Ford Motor Company one thing became apparent in this 
research - Ford Motor Company lacks a structured and standardized approach to 
manufacturing continuous improvement prohibiting the re-innovation to a lean enterprise and 
direct competition with Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corporation. Can Ford achieve 
sustained success implementing "The Way Forward" plan, or does "The Way Forward" plan 
need to incorporate the "Process to Sustained Success" to meet Ford's long-term goals? The 
benchmark company for comparison is Toyota Motor Manufacturing Company. 
E - Scope of Thesis: 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I gives an initial introduction to the history of 
Ford Motor Company, and Lean Manufacturing principles. Chapter II will focus on the 
current operations and structure at Ford Motor Company based on the steps of the "Process 
to Sustained Success". Chapter III, using the same steps of the "Process to Sustained 
Success", outlines proposed changes in the philosophy, management, engineering, and 
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manufacturing structure to improve Ford Motor Company seeking long-term profitability. 
Many comparisons and analogies will be made with Toyota Motor Manufacturing Company. 
Chapter IV presents a literature review of great leadership and managerial philosophy and 
techniques, and how they should be applied to Ford Motor Company. Additionally, it will 
take us through the 5 Why's of how Ford came to be in the shape it's in. Chapter V provides 
conclusions and recommendations on potential areas for further study. 
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Chapter II: Process to Sustained Success - Current State of Ford Motor Company 
A. Level Scheduling: 
A level schedule starts with the customer, and is an integral and important factor in deciding 
production rates and volumes for each vehicle line. The Japanese call Level Scheduling, 
Heijunka, which sequences orders in a repetitive pattern, and smoothing the day-to-day 
variations in total orders to correspond to long-term demand. The strategic implications are 
vast regarding vehicle inventory levels, raw material purchases, manufacturing tempo, and 
supplier daily production schedule. 
Level Scheduling is accomplished by taking the total orders per product family for a time 
period (e.g. a month), and then create a schedule and build rate. At Ford Motor Company, 
this step is not properly accomplished and induces many wastes including the worst - Over 
Production, and forces Ford's manufacturing systems to "Push" instead of the customer 
demand "Pull System". 
The frustration of Ford's Dealership network over this system is on a steady rise. The system 
works as such: A dealership receives vehicles based on vehicle line allocations; which are 
determined on the sales volume of a particular dealership. As an example, Stuart Powell Ford 
in Danville, KY is allotted only one Mustang GT per month even though they have on 
average three customer orders per month. Ford Motor Company's Marketing group is 
reluctant to provide Stuart Powell's Ford Dealership with more Mustang GT allocations 
because Stuart Powell's vehicle sales on vehicle lines such as the Explorer, Freestar, and 
Freestyle are below Ford :Y(otor Company's expectations. The compromises and dealings 
between Ford Motor Company and Stuart Powell Ford take place with Ford stating that if 
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Stuart Powell takes delivery of three more Explorers then they will receive an extra Mustang 
GT allocation. This action of "packaging" in turn induces a response by Stuart Powell Ford to 
"push" vehicles onto the customers, and typically with Ford Motor Company having to 
provide cosdy incentives to move these products. Failure to sell more Explorers, Freestars, or 
Freestyles forces Ford Motor Company to idle manufacturing facilities due the Marketing and 
Sales down-weeks. Last year, Louisville Assembly Plant (LAP), was shut down for a total of 
seven weeks due to slumping sales. St. Louis Assembly Plant (SLAP, another plant that 
produced the Explorer and Mountaineer) ran at only 25% capacity. And as of 8 March 2006, 
St. Louis Assembly Plant was permanendy idled. [15] 
Ford Motor Company's Marketing and Sales division attempts to balance customer desires for 
certain vehicle lines while keeping the manufacturing facilities operational at a given 
production rate. Due to the inflexibility of most of Ford's manufacturing facilities, the 
mentioned scenario induces a "push" system instead of a "pull" system where a manufacturer 
has the flexibility to produce to customer demand. Downtime in 2005 for LAP and SLAP are 
also attributed gready in part to the inability to adjust Takt time, or production tempo to 
decrease or increase the rate of production based on customer demand. The ability to adjust 
Takt time starts with standardizing work elements and will be discussed in the next chapter 
dealing with a proposed system. 
Again, Level Scheduling starts with the customer, but has profound affects on the 
manufacturing system and quality level of Ford Motor Company's supplier base. The current 
build complexity for the Ford Explorer/Mountaineer/Sport Trac built at L'\P is over 14,000 
different combinations. Most of the complexity is manageable, with only 25 parts brought 
into the plant IL VS. However, the main purpose of Level Scheduling is to smooth daily 
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fluctuating production volume and mix requirements for the fInal manufacturing facility and 
the supplier base for a predetermined period of time to produce and deliver the same part 
number in the same volume and mix. Table 1 shows a snap shot of a typical production 
schedule at LAP (data taken 28 March 2006 at the Louisville Assembly Plant): 
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Table 1 - Example of typical LAP build schedule 
Noticeable in the table above, neither the Body Type nor the engine, in order of precedence 
when determining build schedule, are completely balanced in a set pattern. Next in the order 
of precedence are trim level or Grade, and then color. 
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From a supplier base perspective, the schedule of parts to ship to the manufacturing facility is 
critical for day-to-day scheduling of dies in a press and maintenance. The example below 
shows three weeks of shipping orders for hood components shipped from an outside supplier 
to the Louisville Assembly Plant. The hood inners and outers are for the Explorer, and are 
hemmed one-to-one at the assembly plant. 
Date 
Shipped # Hood Inners Ship~ed to LAP # Hood Outers Shipped to LAP 
10-Apr-06 1040 640 
11-Apr-06 1560 1320 
12-Apr-06 520 1040 
13-Apr-06 520 680 
18-Apr-06 1040 1000 
19-Apr-06 1040 1000 
20-Apr-06 1040 1000 
21-Apr-06 1040 1320 
24-Apr-06 1040 1000 
25-Apr-06 1040 1000 
26-Apr-06 1040 1320 
27-Apr-06 1040 1000 
28-Apr-06 1040 1000 
1-May-06 1040 1720 
2-May-06 1560 1320 
3-May-06 1040 960 
4-May-06 520 714 
7-May-06 0 360 
8-May-06 1040 1360 
9-May-06 520 320 
10-May-06 1560 2000 
11-May-06 2080 1320 
Table 2 - Sample Hood Component Shipping Schedule 
The hood components shipped in on a daily basis fluctuates from a day-to-day and 
component-to-component level, and don't meet the daily production schedule of 1138 units 
produced per day. 
Level Scheduling an important factor in supplier quality. Ford provides suppliers with a 
confIrmed production schedule for a set time period, but does not provide a level daily 
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production schedule. Therefore, a supplier's production requirement in part volume and mix 
may vary dramatically from day to day. In the example above, hood inners and outers are 
paired one for one and assembled to create one complete hood. The daily volume rates are 
significantly different between hood components. 
In order to meet Ford's t1uctuating daily production volume and mix requirements, a typical 
supplier will adjust their manufacturing process in the following ways: 
1 Increase/decrease production run time 
2 Increase/ decrease production cycle time 
3 Add/subtract workers from process line 
4 Increase/decrease scheduled changeovers 
5 Cancel/delay scheduled tooling/equipment maintenance 
6 Cancel/delay scheduled personnel training & development 
7 Bypass structured problem solving 
8 Increase/ decrease downstream supplier production requirements 
All of these actions represent deviations from a standard and result in manufacturing process 
instability and inconsistent part quality. 
Flexible manufacturing is difficult to obtained without practicing the first step of Heijunka; 
which leads to improving and developing standardization methods. 
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B. Standardization: 
Without a Standard - You don't have a problem! Additionally, a Problem is a Deviation from 
a Standard! 
A level schedule provided by Ford Motor Company to its' own manufacturing facilities and 
suppliers alike allow the development and execution to sustain manufacturing processes based 
on Standardization. Achieving a level schedule doesn't make a lean system, but starts and 
promotes the reduction of waste enabling the manufacturing system with the mentality of lean 
concepts. 
Taiichi Ohno was the man who did the most to structure the Toyota Production System (IPS) 
as an integrated framework. Mr. Ohno experimented with various ways of setting up 
equipment to produce items in a timely manner much like Ford Motor Company's founder, 
Henry Ford. But he got a whole new perspective on just-in-time production when he visited 
the United States in 1956. Ohno went to the United States to visit automotive plants, but his 
most important discovery was the U.S. supermarket. He marveled at the way customers chose 
exactly what they wanted and in the quantities they wanted. Ohno admired the way the 
supermarkets supplied merchandise in a simple, efficient, and timely manner. 
Ohno describes TPS in terms of a supermarket. Each production line arrayed its diverse 
output for the following line to choose from, like merchandise on supermarket shelves. Each 
line became the customer for the preceding line, and a supermarket for the following line. 
The following line would choose those items needed and only those items, and the preceding 
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line would produce only the replacement items for the ones the following line had selected. 
This format is a Pull System, driven by the needs of the following lines. It contrasts with 
conventional Push Systems, which are driven by the output of the preceding lines. Going 
back to our level scheduling scenario with the dealerships, Ford Motor Company's current 
system is still the epitome of a Push System. Dealerships are often forced to push vehicles 
even though customer demand isn't there. 
The beautiful supermarket concept also promotes standardization in marketing, packaging, 
shipping, and production of the product to affect the lowest costs and highest profits. Cost 
reductions are key and it starts with leaning the production system of wastes - the greatest 
being over-production. 
A quick review of Ford's Louisville Assembly Plant's Body Shop illustrates a push system with 
much waste in over production, conveyance, and waiting. Illustrating this example again is the 
hood components after hemming into an assembled hood. The management at Louisville 
Assembly Plant chooses to hold around 1200 hoods in storage between the hood assembly 
line and hood install on the manufacturing line: 
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Figure 2 - Assembled Hoods in racks awaiting installation 
The Hood Line is capable of running 110 hoods per hour compared with the vehicle assembly 
line of 80 jobs per hour. This over-speed of the Hood Line leads to the greatest waste noted 
in the picture above - Over-Production; which leads to the other wastes of Inventory and 
extra Material Conveyance to move to storage then to production. Keeping a balance of 
hoods near 1200 per day costs Louisville Assembly Plant around $81,600 per week in 
adclitional inventory carrying costs, and jeoparclizes the abiliry to move assembled hoods in a 
First in - First out, queue, fashion. If stock is not rotated in a standarclized manner, the ability 
to problem solve a defect is very clifficult if the team doesn't have the when, where, and why a 
defect occurred. 
Understanding a defect and a defect definition starts with the process that an operator has to 
perform. Ford Motor Company attempts to standarclize manufacturing processes as outlined 
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in the process database, GSP AS, across the company globally. One of the failures of the 
system, though, is the lack of training and consistency among process sheet writers. An 
example of inconsistent process writing: 
Element 010 - OBTAIN FENDER FROM RACK 
Element 020 - OBTAIN FOUR SCREWS 
Element 030 - HANDSTART FOUR SCREWS 
Element 040 - TIGHTEN FOUR SCREWS 
As compared to this incorrect version: 
Element 010 - OBTAIN FENDER FROM RACK 
Element 020 - OBTAIN FOUR SCREWS 
Element 030 - HANDSTART FOUR SCREWS 
Element 040 - OBTAIN NUT RUNNER 
Element 050 - SECURE FOUR SCREWS 
What's the importance of a verb? Ford's GSPAS system calculates MODAPTS , MODular 
Arrangement of Predetermined Time Standards, to utilize as a basis for operator work 
instructions. In the verb "TIGHTEN" MODAPTS calculates the time for an operator to 
retrieve nut-runner, position nut-runner to screw, trigger nut-runner till torque, and aside nut-
runner. In the second series of instructions, Element 040 is redundant and inaccurate on two 
occasions. First, the verb "OBTAIN" is to procure a part not a tool. Secondly, MODAPTS 
calculates time from the verb "SECURE" to retrieve nut-runner, position screw to nut-runner, 
position nut-runner and screw to joint, trigger nut-runner till torque, and aside nut-runner. 
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Basically, one of the most common mistakes in process writing is using incorrect verbs. In the 
example above, if the verb "HANDSTART" is used due to a cross-threading problem, then 
the verb "TIGHTEN" must be used - "SECURE" cannot be used in this example. The verb 
"SECURE" is used when a bolt, nut, or screw is placed to the driving implement of the nut-
runner and shot in the joint without hand starting ftrst (most operations are completed using 
"SECURE"). Therefore, a quick audit of many process sheets will show a lack of training and 
inconsistent process writing by the Manufacturing Engineering staff. 
Standardization of process sheets are important in the creation of Operator Instruction Sheets 
(OIS); which were initially hand-written by operators themselves, but proved so un-
standardized in execution and verbiage to the actual work performed as seen in Figure 3. The 
new system in place is based directly off the GSP AS process sheets making standardization of 
language and format critical to quality. The problem: since work elements are not 
standardized within Ford, OIS sheets attempt to accomplish this without the philosophy to 
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Figure 3 - Assembler written Operator Instruction Sheet from Louisville Assembly 
Plant 
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Ensuring correct verbs within process sheets is an absolute must if improvements in 
"Standardized Work Elements" can ever happen at Ford Motor Company. The current 
system to "Balance a Line" is the old tried and true stopwatch. The problem of the stopwatch 
is that it doesn't take into account the level of effort of a particular element, but based on how 
fast one worker completes the designated tasks and then attempts to set a standard based this 
worker. The real problem comes into play when a "ringer" is positioned on a job to set up a 
job a fast rate, then pulled from the job after a period of time causing those positioned on the 
job afterward to struggle causing quality defects and through-put concerns. MODAPTS is not 
subjective and takes the stopwatch out of the calculation of production standards, improving 
employee relations while adding objectivity to standards. No longer will you discuss how fast a 
particular person is working during a time study, because MODAPTS requires no 
performance rating. 
Unfortunately, the current system uses performance rated stopwatch evaluations to set up jobs 
making the job to standardize work elements a virtual impossibility. Without creating 
standardized work elements the results are manufacturing process instabilities and inconsistent 
part quality. Strict adherence to process standards promotes structured problem solving and 
allows operators and suppliers alike to readily identify variations in the process and parts. 
With a lack of standards, or a culture that commonly promotes deviations from a standard, a 
supplier cannot easily control process stability or part quality. 
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C. Structured Problem Solving: 
A problem is a deviation from a standard! Customer Satisfaction improvements mean the 
reduction or elimination of problems. To accomplish elimination of problems, Structured 
Problem Solving events must occur. The current methodologies to structured problem 
solving involve the use of specialized training with 6Sigma by certified Black Belts and Green 
Belts, and the Giobal8D (eight disciplines) process. Louisville Assembly Plant employs four 
full-time Green Belts to assist in problem resolution. The Green Belt positions are an added 
job classification to the UAW-Ford agreement bringing the total number of unskilled 
classifications to fourteen. This is an important fact emphasizing UAW core values that an 
assembler's job is to assemble parts, not problem solve. Problem solving is then left to the 
classification of the Green Belts. 
Personnel with the job classification of Inspector are charged to find problems as seen in 
Figure 4. However, there are many instances where Ford implements poka-yoke devices or 
systems into the process, especially if they are critical. Examples: correct door hinges, DC 
nut-runners with feedback tied to the manufacturing line, and vision systems inspecting for 
the correct part or attribute. 
However, to be truly lean and employ good structured problem solving techniques, inspection 
must occur at the operation - called informative inspection. 
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Figure 4 - Current State Process Map 
In this process, installation of the Center High Mount Stop Light (CHMSL) is inspected at the 
end of the Chassis Line and in Pre-Delivery with the installation process occurring several 
hours prior in the Trim Area and far from the point of operation. 
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This type of inspection is called Judgment Inspection and engages in the practice of statistical 
quality control (SQC) with inputs by the inspectors into a computerized tracking system. 
Unfortunately, only the defect is tracked, but not what causes the defect. For this, a Black Belt 
or Green Belt is called in to assess and correct the problem. This system is hardly lean 
resulting in the wastes of motion, correction, and over processing. Again, this type of 
inspection does not occur at the operation where the defect can readily be seen and a 
corrective action or containment performed prior to advancing to the next operation. The 
end effect is quality defects that go unnoticed end up at the customer raising warranty costs 
and decreasing customer satisfaction. 
Using the assembled hood example again, the biggest in-plant containment actions for LAP's 
Body Shop are hood fit problems. Hood fit issues are attributed to several factors: hood inner 
shape and hood outer trim flange lengths, assembled hood storage methodology and storage 
time. There are basically four distinct points around the hood at the four corners that are 
deemed critical to customer satisfaction. Understanding the factors through Structured 
Problem Solving techniques is essential in to improving customer satisfaction. The analysis is 
discussed in the next section. 
D. Customer Satisfaction: 
Customer satisfaction is critical to the end goal of increasing profits. Maintaining customer 
satisfaction is an absolute must in this competitive world market; which gives no advantages to 
new vehicles. The demanding consumer base expects world-class quality right from the gate. 
Unfortunately, Ford Motor Company lags far behind its competitors from an initial launch 
Global Quality Reporting System survey shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 6 - GQRS TGW /1000 Five-Year Trend Chart 
This figure shows that in the last five years, Ford Motor Company has made approximately 
500 TGW /1000 improvement, but still lags significantly behind its competitors. 
The lack of significant improvement to keep pace with industry leaders Toyota and Honda, 
according to Anne Stevens, Executive VP, The Americas, Ford Motor Company [16]: 
Reality on Quality 
1 Key to our products' success in the marketplace is competitive quality: 
o Some improvements have been made, but Ford still lags the competition 
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o Our competitors have the same processes we do - the difference is their execution 
strategy 
2 Execution is the key to our success 
Practices and Behaviors Resulting in our Current State 
1 Lack of focus on the containment of issues and the implementation of permanent 
corrective actions on things that matter most to the customer 
2 Absence of cross-functional alignment on top customer driven concerns 
3 Lack of process discipline, accountability, and enablers in place to deliver vehicles that 
are better than out -going models 
4 We rely on customers to ftnd issues - instead of utilizing less costly internal methods 
The two most important bullet points from Anne Stevens are that our competitors' execution 
strategy is different, and a lack of process discipline. In the next chapter, a "5 Why" drill 
down will help explain the lack of manufacturing continuous improvement, and highlight why 
the Japanese automakers are enjoying their current day advantage. 
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E. Profitability: 
Ford Motor Company is experiencing profitability problems in its North American 
Automotive Operations for the last several years. For 2005, Ford's North America automotive 
operations reported a pre-tax loss of $1.6 billion. The full report is outlined in Appendix D. 
A quick review oflast year's stock market value trend, Figure 7, shows an unsustainable trend 
or any form of improvement, and this can be attributed to lack of customer satisfaction and 
consumer confidence in the real or perceived quality of Ford Motor Company's products. 
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Figure 7 - Ford Motor Company's 6 Month Stock Valuation Trend Chart 
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Figure 8 - Ford Motor Company's 30 year Stock Valuation Trend Chart 
Higher stock price allows a company more capital to work with to invest in research and 
development, new products, or improving manufacturing facilities to a leaner system. Most of 
Ford's assembly plants are in need of significant capital investments to update the 
manufacturing equipment to truly flexible systems. Current manufacturing systems are 
capable of only building one basic model with brand variations, i.e. Explorer and Mountaineer. 
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Chapter III: Process to Sustained Success - The Proposal 
A. Profitability: 
Why are we here? Only one answer exists - To Make Money. There is no other altruistic 
point being in business. Understanding how an enterprise becomes more profitable a review 
of the industry leader's financial performance as a comparison to Ford Motor Company's 
performance is the first step. 
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Figure 9 - One Year Trend Stock Price Valuation Comparison - Ford to Toyota 
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FORD MOTOR CO Splits: ... 
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Figure 10 - Ten Year Trend Stock Price Valuation Comparison - Ford to Toyota 
The stock price gap between Ford and Toyota increased dramatically in the last five years 
because of Toyota's adoption of TPS or lean manufacturing principles through necessity over 
50 years ago. Over the last 50 years, Toyota has nurtured its Toyota Production System in the 
elimination of waste and thereby raising quality. Improving quality and keeping costs down 
through waste elimination produces greater customer satisfaction and profits. The stock price 
trend chart in Figure 10 is an outcome and reward the illustrates Toyota's continuous 
improvements, while at the same time demonstrating Ford's lack of continuous improvement 
and sustainability in customer satisfaction measured by lost stock price. 
The best way to accomplish this is by implementing a total cost accounting strategy and 
getting away from the "Task" based strategy that doesn't promote continuous improvements 
in quality. The philosophy that elimination of all wastes is essential to all business and 
manufacturing decisions is imperative to increasing customer satisfaction and greater profit 
returns. 
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B. Customer Satisfaction: 
To improve the business bottom line give customers the products they want with the quality 
they expect at reasonable costs delivered on time. Companies that are more efficient than 
their competitors in providing customers with high-quality goods and services will thrive. 
Those that are less efficient than their competitors will parish. The globalization of markets 
means customers don't have to accept anything less. 
Toyota has been able to sustain its increasing trend in share value, customer satisfaction, and 
automotive market share. By fostering TPS over the last 50 years, "Management and labor 
have developed an intrinsic trust between each other, which has only deepened over the years. 
Management has rewarded employees for productivity gains with improved compensation and 
working conditions. Employees have taken the initiative in activities for raising efficiency and 
otherwise enhancing the company's competitiveness." [17] In addition, Toyota understands 
the fundamental principle for reliability is to avoid changing the conditions of a good design. 
Example: my wife's 1993 Toyota Camry has the exact same steering wheel, cruise control 
system, window and door lock controls, door handles, and park brake lever to name a few 
items as Toyota's 2006 4Runner. Take a good design, keep it, and apply kaizen along the way. 
Ford has not been able to make that leap in improvements to keep up with the competition. 
According to Anne Stevens' point shared in the last chapter, "Our competitors have the same 
processes we do - the difference is their execution strategy." To understand how Ford must 
improve look at Ford's history and ask the Five Why's. 
Why was Ford dominant in the early 1900's? Henry Ford's emphasis was on manufacturing 
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efficiency. 
Why the lack of continuous improvement? Focus shift to product development and lost 
emphasis on manufacturing continuous improvements. 
Why the shift to product development? The adoption of Modem Business Principles 
by Ford's management team focused the philosophy to product development. 
Why adopt "Modem Business Principles"? At the time, Ford's accounting system 
was in shambles and needed a shake up with good cost accounting. 
Fortunately, the government made this an easier task by controlling the price 
of steel. In addition, after WWII, attention turned to designing the cars 
people wanted - stylistic cars and in large quantities. 
Why develop stylistic cars in large quantities? At the time, American's demand 
was over-whelming for vehicles as new interstates were built, and the 
United States expanded to sub-division life styles. At the same time, 
there was no outside competition since WWII decimated most of 
Germany and Japan's manufacturing facilities. 
Japan in contrast after WWII had miniscule production volumes per model, which did not 
allow Japanese automakers the luxury of using specialized equipment for each model. Nor did 
they allow stocking huge inventories of parts. In essence, Japanese automakers had to be lean 
to survive. To survive, Toyota developed its' Toyota Production System and implemented it 
across all functions in its company starting with its manufacturing system over to product 
development good design reviews that emphasize discovery of undetected problems caused by 
intentional or incidental changes. 
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The Toyota Production System supports productivity gams by highlighting waste and 
engenders quality gains by illuminating problems when and where they occur. In other words, 
by moving from Judgment Inspection to Informative Inspection - inspection at the process -
quality and customer satisfaction gains are made. 
Ford concentrated more on mass production of stylistic vehicle that were more works of art at 
times, but lacked manufacturing techniques to continuously improve a design or 
manufacturing process. This attitude still exists today at Ford Motor Company. 
C. Structured Problem Solving: 
To give customers what they want and expect, we must identify and understand variations in 
our processes and parts and use structured problem solving events to eliminate problems and 
waste. 
At Ford and Toyota alike, machines are equipped to detect production problems and shut 
down immediately when one occurs, indicating where and what type of problem it is on a 
marquee board or other display. According to Shingo Shigeo, "At Toyota, however, the most 
important issue is not how quickly personnel are alerted to a problem, but what solutions are 
implemented." [18] 
Revisiting the hood fit problem at Ford's Louisville Assembly Plant, four factors contribute to 
the degradation of hood quality during the process: Hood inner shape, hood outer flange 
length, storage method, and storage time. Using these factors in a Structured Problem Solving 
technique called Design of Experiments (DOE), we are able to find which factors are critical, 
and the interactions between the factors given the response variable of hood deflection at 
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customer defmed specific points around the hood: 
dY (Hood Deflection) = F(X) = function of (1\ = Inner Shape, B = Outer ('lange, C = Storage Time, & D=Storagc Method) 
Factors: 
• A - Inner Panel Shape at rear comers (current vs. lmm above nominal) 
• B - Outer Panel Flange Length (current vs. 3mm short) 
• C - Storage Time (panels measured within 1 Smin of hemming vs. 24hr hold) 
• D - Storage Method (panels stored Vertically vs. Horizontally) 
-- --
Figure 11: 2006 Explorer Hood Significant Characteristics for Quality 
In Figure 11, points 3, 9, 23, and 30 around the hood are deemed the most critical to customer 
satisfaction based on warranty analysis and other quality indicators such as JD Powers report 
and Global Quality Reporting System (GQRS) for craftsmanship. Evaluating around points 3, 
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9,23, and 30 for this exercise and using a 4 factor, 2 level DOE the results are computed using 
Minitab: 
Response is sheet metal deflection from nominal on hood Pt a3: 
Mu~i-Vari Chart for 013 by Inr Shape - storage Method 
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Figure 12: DOE results for Pt a3 around 2006 Explorer Hood 
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Response is sheet metal deflection from nominal on hood Pt a9 
Multi-Vari Chart for a9 by Inr Shape - storage Method 
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Figure 13: DOE results for Pt a9 around 2006 Explorer Hood 
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Mutti- Vari Chart for a23 by Inr Shape - storage Method 
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Figure 14: DOE results for Pt a23 around 2006 Explorer Hood 
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Multi-Vari Chart for a30 by Inr Shape - storage Method 
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Figure 30: DOE results for Pt a30 around 2006 Explorer Hood 
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2nd Level DOE Analysis: 
• Chose 8 CTQ's - pts 3,5,9,11,21,23,27,30 
• Analyzing the data shows -
• A - Int Shape (5) 
• B - Flange Length (4) 
• C - Storage Time (5) 
• D - Storage Method (8) 
Significant Interactions: 
• AB (6) 
• CD (5) 
• Which Factors have highest cost implications? 
• Validation Study: Run 5 panels with the same xl, x2, x3, and x4 
Next Steps: 
• Define critical few "x's" 
• Find mathematical relationship: y=f(x) 
• Identify operating window of critical x's to achieve desired "Y" 
DOE results analyzed and optimized to define the mathematical model: 
~ Y (ilnod Deflection) = F(X) = function of (,\ = Inner Shape, B = Outer Flange, & C = Storage Time) 
Mathematical Models: 
Pt 3: ~y = -0.007 + O.OOSA + 0.004B + 0.009C + 0.007AB 
Pt 9: ~y = 0.659 + 0.17C 
Pt 23: ~y = 0.379 - O.lSB + 0.2SC 
Pt 30: ~y = -0.037 + 0.004C 
Most Important Factor = Storage Method: Horizontal- Recommended by DOE 
Recommendations for hood quality improvements are: 
• Maintain current Hood Inner Shape 
• Maintain current Hood Outer Flange length 
• Store completed hoods horizontally for 24 hours for epoxy cure if not cured during e-coat 
oven process. 
However, in keeping with Lean Manufacturing principles, recommend hood conveyor from 
Hood Hemming Line to Hood Installation station (70 ft distance) keeping hoods in the 
horizontal position during the short conveyance. The completed bodies then go through 
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Paint's e-coat system and ovens; which, fully cures the two-part epoxy in the hood hem. 
Contrasted with the LAP management direction for hood storage as shown in the following 
picture: 
Figure 16 - Hood Storage Methodology in Contrast with DOE Recommendations 
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Understanding the problem is vital to developing solutions that permanently reduce the error 
state. This requires what the Japanese call: Genchi Genbutso - Go Look and See. Using 
Structured Problem Solving in the form of a DOE, the best methodology for manufacturing 
the Explorer hood was determined. Missing from this manufacturing scene is the 
implementation of the DOE recommendations by management adding wastes and costs to 
the Ford enterprise - the greatest being over production which leads to most of the other 
types of wastes. 
From a broad perspective, to accomplish Structured Problem Solving effectively, as stated in 
the previous section on customer satisfaction, Ford Motor Company and the UAW need to 
restructure the negotiated contract eliminating many lines of demarcation and job 
classifications leaving only several to manage - Quality Leader, Team Member, and Material 
Handling for instance. This action will effectively promote the ability to reduce or eliminate 
Judgment Inspection in favor of Informative Inspection by allowing inspection to be part of 
the process and operation. During an informative inspection, you check for abnormalities and 
perform feedback and action; this allows you to eliminate the cause of the problem at the 
source and reduce defects. In Figure 4, the two inspectors at the end of the line would be 
unnecessary, and non-value added to the process since the detection of errors they catch don't 
give an indication of the root cause. We might be able to infer to the root cause, but without 
seeing defect occur an inference is all it is, which requires more investigation by dedicated 
Black Belts or Green Belts. 
"Instead of looking for defects that have already occurred, informative or source inspections 
check for errors that may cause defects. Feedback is then carried out and immediate action 
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taken to prevent the error from generating a defect. 
Thus, there are two types of quality control: 
1 Quality control to reduce defects by judgment inspection 
2 Quality control to eliminate defects by informative inspection" [19] 
Therefore, the reduction of job classifications would allow Ford Motor Company to insert 
manual inspection methods into the process as part of standardized work elements reducing 
the potential for defects. 
D. Standardization: 
Every problem is a deviation from a standard! Strict adherence to process standards promotes 
structured problem solving and identification of variations and waste. Starting with the 
operators and using MODAPTS to standardize every element of work to its basic form allows 
each operation to be balanced based on Takt time with the ability to add informative 
inspection into the process where needed. MODAPTS standardizes every motion including 
steps or walks to discreet amounts of time. This method eliminates performance rated 
stopwatch evaluations, and the mistrust formed between management and labor. 
The Lean benefits of standardizing work elements allow the creation of "Standardized Work 
Combination Tables", shown in Table 2, not only prescribes operator instructions in a 
standardized format, it also allows the operators, supervisors, and engineers alike to see 
unnecessary non-valued added wastes in the process. Knowing the unnecessary non-valued 
added wastes provides a basis for continuous improvement in efficiency and quality of the 
products. 
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STANDARDIZED WORK COMBINATION TABLE Name I Kenneth Ryan Qty/Sh,fi 600 ~:t~Ual ____ _ _ 
PROCESsl C-Pillar Assembly TIME Date I 1 Apil2006 TAKT 75 seconds (2 setsllWalk MI, ,., 
11 Inspect in-process part LH Pack LH set 10 














ITOTAL 68 36 5 
Table 3 - Standardized Work Combination Table 
Standardizing work elements can only happen with better training and strict adherence to 
process writing standards by the engineering community. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, inconsistently written process sheets lead to inaccurate MODAPTS, which in turn 
affect standardizing work elements. 
Standardizing work elements also gives engineering an understanding of labor impacts and 
process methodologies of a new system helping to avoid troublesome spots far ahead of 
implementation. To illustrate this point, a quick summary of Louisville Assembly Plant's hood 
line showed over 1200 hoods waiting for value-added work (installation to a vehicle) 
increasing inventory costs, material handling costs for extra conveyance of parts in racks, and 
two extra operators to transfer hoods from assembly line to racks. 
Standardization of work through virtual manufacturing techniques and structured problem 
solving enhances manufacturing innovation into lean production systems. One of those 
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systems being investigated to re-innovate Ford Motor Company to a lean manufacturing 
system is laser welding. 
L.A.P. LASER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC 
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Figure 17 - Louisville Assembly Plant Laser System Schematic 
This one laser cell will cut holes and weld the roof panel onto Explorers, Mountaineers, and 
Sport Tracs replacing six different welding stations performing the tasks in 23 seconds 
compared to conventional resistance welding's 2 minutes and 33 seconds. Both time and 
space are saved along with the great waste of over production by reducing the numbers of 
vehicles in the system from six to one. 
This manufacturing technological innovation also allows greater flexibility in product 
development advances in materials and weight as demonstrated in the next figure. 
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8 
Construction Unit Width 
Figure 18 - Laser Welding vs. Resistance Welding Reduction of Flange 
Laser Welding vs. Spot Welding Comparison 
Conventional Spot Welding Laser Welding 
1.1_>--+<-.,- 8.0 
14.5 
.... /./~( ~, 
REP Distance vom REP: 
Spot Welding.: Laser: 
1 1 8mm 2.25mm 
Minimum: 6mm 
With metal sheet thickness more than 3.5 mm a diameter of the spot torch of20mm is required! 
Figure 19 - Laser Welding vs. Spot Welding Comparison 
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Advantages of reduced flange widths follow a lean system in manufacturing and design by 
producing sections that: 
1 Higher prof1le section at same work piece width 
2 Less weight 
3 Higher stiffness in seams in comparison to conventional welding techniques 
4 High process speed 
By implementing these engineering innovations and standardizing these systems across Ford's 
manufacturing arena, Ford can realize waste reductions in the design and manufacturing 
systems allowing the assembly plants more flexibility to meet customer demand of the 
products desired. 
E. Level Scheduling: 
To achieve process stability and system standardization it is recommended that Ford Motor 
Company and its supplier base practice Level Scheduling. A level production schedule allows 
suppliers and the company to achieve production process stability. The purpose is to meet 
customer demand by adjusting a manufacturing facility's build schedule to stable volumes and 
mix rates over a set period of time. This keeps inventories from varying dramatically day-to-
day allowing better control over materials and reducing the burden of over-production. 
A level schedule allows a supplier to develop, execute, and sustain a manufacturing process 
based on Standardization and incorporated in the following processes: 
1 Delivery schedule - reduce inventory to what is needed by the customer 
2 Production schedule based on a consistent cycle time, process layout, & number of 
workers - increase efficiencies thus reducing non-value added work, and fully utilizing 
each worker 
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3 Tooling & Equipment Preventative Maintenance schedule - allows scheduled time to 
perform critical PM work on necessary tools and equipment. 
4 Structured Problem Solving - level scheduling promotes standardization from which a 
problem is a deviation from a standard and forces inspection back to the process to 
understand and root cause the concern. 
5 Scheduled continuous improvement - allows for Ford's 6Sigma kaizen events to occur 
to make enhancements in the design or process. 
6 Downstream supplier production/delivery schedule - it all starts with the customer 
and a level schedule allows for deliveries meeting customer demand for the products 
they want. 
Earlier shown was a typical Ford build schedule in Table 1. Table 3 takes that same schedule 
and levels it based on Body Type and Engine. You can go even further in detail by leveling on 
items of greater complexity such as vehicle Grade and Color. 
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Table 4 - Louisville Assembly Plant with Level Schedule 
Compared to Table 1, Table 3 illustrates a more repetitive pattern for Body Type and Engine 
level production schedule so that for a set period of time a supplier is required to produce and 
deliver the same part number, in the same volume and mix (generally with a maximum 
fluctuation of ±S%). Again, a level schedule allows the downstream supplier to standardize its 
production/ delivery schedule, which in turn affects a positive outcome in quality and 
ultimately customer satisfaction. 
Shigeo Shingo best describes Toyota's level scheduling system, "While some argue that the 
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most important benefit of the Toyota production system is that it prevents surplus capacity 
disparities from influencing upstream processes, its real superiority lies in its ability to 
minimize stocks of finished products." [20] 
Louisville Assembly Plant needs improved understanding of Lean techniques to improve its 
competitiveness as demonstrated by one simple system - the hood assembly and storage line. 
As shown in Table 2, hood inners and outers should be scheduled in the same quantity 
supplied on a daily basis to meet manufacturing demands based on customer orders; which 
improves the quality of parts from special cause damages, thus improving customer 
satisfaction. 
With increased customer satisfaction, demand for the vehicle could stabilize or rise allowing 
better marketing and sales forecasting. The ultimate goal is the ability to give the customers 
the vehicles they want without having to create "dealer packages" in order to push product 
onto the customer base, again "minimizing stocks of finished products" and thus creating a 
leaner system in inventory, or over production. But the whole manufacturing and product 
development systems behind it must be standardized and structured to provide for this 
"customer driven Pull system", resolving problems in a structured format, increase quality and 
customer satisfaction, ultimately increasing profits. After all, aren't we here for the money? 
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Chapter IV: Literature Review - Leadership & Philosophy to Sustainable Profitability 
A. Confronting the brutal truth: 
3 April 2006: Toyota Motor Manufacturing stock ptlce closed at $110.35; Ford Motor 
Company - $7.77! How do you explain Toyota's stock price valued at 14.2 times the value of 
Ford's? 
According to the Chicago Tribune l21], "The easy explanation is that U.S. carmakers start at a 
clear disadvantage: They are plagued by "legacy costs," the sky-high pension and health-care 
expenses brought on by union contracts and generations of retired employees." The article 
points out, "But interviews with current and former Ford executives indicate that there are 
other, less obvious legacy costs as well. Ford, they say, suffers from years of short-term 
thinking and billions in questionable investments. While it tried to adopt the highly-efficient 
management strategies pioneered by Toyota, those efforts have been hobbled by a lack of 
firm, consistent leadership at the top and a divisive, feudalistic corporate culture that has 
grown up over the years. The result is a high-cost, inflexible operation that leaves Ford trailing 
even GM when it comes to efficiency. David Cole, chairman of the Center for Automotive 
Research, a non-profit think tank based in Ann Arbor, Mich., estimates that excluding labor 
expenses, Ford's operating costs are as much as $1,000 per vehicle higher than GM's - a major 
competitive disadvantage. Former Ford executives say the gap between Ford and Toyota on 
the cost of materials has trended as high as $1,600 a vehicle. "If GM had Ford's (operating) 
costs it would be gone," Cole said." 
"What's most striking - and telling - about this period of management turmoil is how different 
it is from the way Toyota operates. Consistent leadership, teamwork and investment in the 
future are the hallmarks of the Toyota system. "It requires leadership behavior that is long 
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term and contemplative," said University of I\Iichigan professor Jeffrey Liker, author of the 
"The Toyota Way." "It requires a way of working together and reaching a degree of consensus. 
This is a set of things that don't come naturally to a traditional U.S. manufacturer like Ford."" 
[2: 11 
Mark Fields calls the problem "chimneys" as illustrated by another Ford executive's account in 
the same Chicago Tribune article, "As executives sought to protect their empires, meetings of 
the l\mericas group often devolved into blame fests, not problem-solving sessions, said one 
former member of the group. Worse, a lack of fIrm leadership meant the company was often 
run by committee where everyone had a vote. This led to slow decision-making and a 
dysfunctional lack of accountability."[21[ 
The lack of accountability is a failure of management to recognize the overall importance of 
the endgame - sustainable profItability. But how do you deal with these adverse fInancial 
times when you don't know how the story will prevail? 
In the Stockdale Paradox, Admiral James Stockdale, Congressional i'vIedal of Honor recipient 
for shouldering the burden of command as a prisoner of war in Vietnam's Hannoi Hilton 
from 1965-1973 keeping high the number i\merican prisoners that survived, said of that 
adverse time, "I never lost faith in the end of the story," he said, when I asked him. "I never 
doubted not only that 1 would get out, but also that I would prevail in the end and turn the 
eKperience into the defIning event of my life, which, in retrospect, I would not trade." 
When asked, "who didn't make it out?" "Oh, that's easy," Admiral Stockdale responded, "the 
optimists!" 
Continuing his lesson, Admiral Stockdale made one of the most crucial points that Ford 
eKecutives need to fully understand and appreciate, "This is a very important lesson. You must 
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never confuse faith that you will prevail in the end-\V-hich you can never afford to lose-with 
the discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might 
be." [22] 
B. Leadership: 
Has the Way Forward Plan confronted the brutal reality that Ford Motor Company needs to 
change? Absolutely. Is the Way Forward Plan realistic about achieving sustainable success by 
2008? Probably not is the answer. Where do you start? You start naturally at the top with 
leadership. 
Let's look at a different industry comparing Bethlehem Steel to Nucor Steel. Both companies 
faced the competitive challenge of cheap imported steel. "Bethlehem Steel's CEO summed 
up the company's problems in 1983 by blaming imports: "Our fIrst, second, and third 
problems are imports." Ken Iverson and his crew at Nucor considered the same challenge 
from imports a blessing, a stroke of good fortune ("Aren't we lucky; steel is heavy, and they 
have to ship it all the way across the ocean, giving us a huge advantage!"). Iverson saw the 
fIrst, second, and third problems facing the American steel industry not to be imports, but 
management ... telling a stunned gathering of fellow steel executives in 1977 that the real 
problems facing the American steel industry lay in the fact that management had failed to keep 
pace with innovation." [231 
Innovation is the key to Bill Ford's vision as he introduced the Way Forward Plan, "Bill Ford: 
"Ford Motor Company was solidly profItable in 200S and growing around the world. The 
next chapter in our history will be remembered for a renewed commitment to innovation and 
as the time we moved boldly to prepare Ford's North American business for global 
competition." [9] 
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But as the prenous example of the steel industry exemplifies, 1t takes leadership able 
understand what needs to happen to build, create, and contribute to sustained success. It 
takes a "Level 5 Leader". 
The lack of Level 5 Leaders as Jim Collins, author of "Good to Great" puts it, is probably the 
most oppressive factor in Pord's current situation. According to Jim Collins, "Level 5 leaders 
want to see the company even more successful in the next generation, comfortable with the 
idea that most people won't even know that the roots of that success trace back to their 
efforts. As one J ,evel 5 leader said, "I want to look out from my porch at one of the great 
companies in the world someday and be able to say, 'I used to work there.' " [241 
At Pord, the situation is more akin to the Chicago Tribune article, "But former executives say 
the question isn't intent - it's execution. Because Ford has so many engineering fiefdoms and a 
lack of strong leaders to force them to cooperate, agreeing on a shared design or dividing up 
development responsibilities can turn into a dogfight. One former executive, for instance, said 
bc~cause of turf battles, the percentage of common parts on the Mazda6-Pusion platform is 
only 30 percent, well behind the Japanese. This means Ford isn't getting the full benefit of 
economies of scale in parts buying. Instead, it is forced to hammer on suppliers for lower 
costs, creating financial problems for them." r21] 
Creating financial problems for your supplier base has profound effects on the assembler's 
end cost and quality of parts. In a lean system, the assembler and the supplier must establish 
the most important part of a business relationship - Respect and trust. ;\s James Womack 
states in "The l\1achine That Changed The World", "the assembler must respect the supplier's 
need to make a reasonable profit ... well aware of the learning CU1ye that exists for producing 
practically any item. So they realize that costs should fall in subsequent years, even though 
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raw-materials costs and wages increase somewhat. Improvements in lean-production 
companies should, in fact, come much faster - that is, learning curves should be much steeper 
- than in mass-production companies because of kaizen." [251 
These improvements in cost and quality at the suppliers and the assembler, Ford :t\Iotor 
Company, alike don't happen just because you implement Lean techniques and 
methodologies. So what does make the difference between the comparison company Toyota, 
and Ford? The difference is trust and the realization that improving actual operations are not 
the job of management - it's the job of the workers themselves. 
Toyota's philosophy in leadership is not merely the creation and use of lean toolsets, but in 
making all its work a series of nested, ongoing experiments. Their leadership views 
standardization as the explicit specification of how work is accomplished coupled with testing 
work as it is being done. 1\S Steven Spear states in the Harvard Business Review, May 2004, 
"The end result is that gaps between what is expected and what actually occurs become 
immediately evident. Not only are problems contained, prevented from propagating and 
compromising someone else's work, but the gaps between expectations and reality are 
investigated; a deeper understanding of the product, process, and people is gained; and that 
understanding is incorporated into a new specification, which becomes a temporary "best 
practice" until a new problem is discovered." l26J 
In Toyota's training system, creating LevelS leaders starts with Genchi Genbutso - Go Look 
and See. There is no substitute for direct observation. Leaders are trained to lead by example, 
and foster an atmosphere committed to resolving problems. Toyota accomplishes this by 
training their leaders to directly ObSelye problem letting the failures tell him what he needed to 
know. The leaders then learn how to propose changes that should always be structured as 
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experiments - in structured problem solving events. They are encouraged to experiment as 
frequently as possible, making small incremental changes rather than large system-design 
changes. "\nd last and most important, their leaders coach, not fix! But without getting down 
to the lowest point and understanding how to observe, propose structured experiments, and 
make small changes they cannot lead at Toyota. l\nd without this leadership, the Toyota 
Production System starts to fail. 
C. The Doom Loop: 
Leadership is definitely the key to recovery and building a process to sustain success. "\ny 
Level 5 ] ,eader will recognize that when righting a ship, and new initiative must be \vell 
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Figure 20 - The Doom Loop 
One of the symptoms that you're in the Doom Loop is that you're so overwhelmed by crisis 
you feel there's no time to learn your way out - that's not really true. Everyone acts as if 
there is no time to do tasks that don't appear to contribute to results. Of course, this belief 
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runs counter to what \ve all know from real life. Improved results come from better decisions 
and more effective follow-up, learning, and practice, and not from obsessive focus on the 
outcome. You simply do not get better without practice, and the practice re(luired of most of 
u:; in the Doom J DOP is to engage in ruthlessly honest reflection on what's happening in our 
business. Toyota was in the same situation around 1950, but had a plan called the Toyota 
Production System (l'PS) that they would nurture and foster an environment between 
management and labor to provide for continuous improvement and future sustainable success. 
TPS was well thought out and executed that a whole new industry of experts and consultants 
evolved to what is now known as 1 "can Manufacturing. 
But to get out of the Doom Loop, ~Iark Fields is trying to point this company in the right 
dltection by following one of Toyota's most basic ideas. 
"He [Mark Fields] is also working on another Japanese idea. At Toyota, according to James 
Womack, president of the Lean Enterprise Institute, '\vhat managers do is ask questions - they 
don't give answers." rields hopes to instill the same management style at Ford. 
"Our culture is that the senior guys on top have all the answers and those below must justify 
the thoughts of the higher-ups," Fields said. "But those on top don't have all the answers. I 
don't have all the answers." 
\Vhether Fields is the man to bring order to the maelstrom at Ford remains an open question. 
But Womack said his best strategy is to usc the crisis atmosphere for all it's worth. People 
forget, he said, that Toyota nearly went bankrupt in 1950 and only afterwards developed its 
world-beating system. Paraphrasing Taiichi Ohno, an early advocate of the Toyota Production 
System, Womack said, "No one does this stuff unless they're desperate." 1211 
After an intensive study of the Way hmvard plan, I find myself questioning what the "Plan" 
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really is, and how it's going to meet Ford f\Iotor Company's financial goals and allow 
sustainable success. Ford f\Iotor Company has all the tool sets in its inventory, but just needs 
to get back to the history that Henry Ford created - uncompromising improvements in 
manufacturing efficiency and quality. Henry demonstrated his leadership by looking for 
himself, experimenting for himself, and teaching and expecting the same from the people 
around him. These are the philosophies that Ford was built on, and Toyota vastly improved. 
Therefore, I conclude that "The Way I·'orward" plan needs to adopt "The Process for 
Sustained Success" to fully utilize its Lean Manufacturing toolsets and achie\'e Ford Motor 
Company's long-term goals to be successful many years in the future. 
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Chapter V: Conclusions 
A. Summary: 
This thesis introduced a unique high-le,rel perspective on the implementation of Lean 
J\[anufacturing to Ford l\lotor Company. The Process to Sustained Success leads Ford on a 
journey to adopt and use lean manufacturing in every aspect of its business from marketing 
and sales to the manufacturing centers, accounting, material handling and scheduling, product 
development, and Ford's supplier base. 
The concept that continuous improvement through waste reduction in the automoti,'C 
industry lay with the achievements of Henry Ford putting all the pieces together to create a 
complete system of mass production starting with the moving conveyor belt and division of 
labor. Toyota's creation out of necessity, the Toyota Production System, invented the new 
concepts of lean production extending from product planning through all the steps of 
manufacture and supply system coordination onto the customer. Toyota's almost fanatical 
adherence to the Toyota Production System and waste reduction has led them to become the 
most profitable automotive maker in the world. 
The Process to Sustained Success really did nothing more than assimilate lean manufacturing 
techniques into a simple management process tool to help dri,re waste reduction and increase 
profitability. But it asks certain hard things of the leadership at Ford Motor Company: 
1 Change the way you think about your role at Ford from a manager to a teacher and 
coach by learning the simple techniques of observation and experimentation to 
reduce waste. Teaching and fostering an environment that promotes waste reduction 
has the positive effect of improving the company's profitability through the 
elimination of direct and indirect costs. The simple attitude of looking for and 
obselTing the best way to reduce \vastes and defects will have an enormous benefit in 
customer satisfaction by eliminating problems before they occur. 
2 Align your organization not around the fiefdoms you've built, but around what's best 
for the enterprise of Ford l\lotor Company. Standardizing organizations around 
design, processes and disciplines, then simplifying and communizing components 
that customers don't regard as high impact to 'Thicle desire, i.e. window switches, 
creates the basis for standardization in the manufacturing arenas. Through 
standardization of designs, manufacturing wastes can be observed and eliminated. In 
addition to standardizing designs and processes, practicing] ,evel Scheduling starts the 
process of flexible manufacturing allowing Materials, Planning, & Logistics 0\fP&L) 
to optimize packaging of parts, and routes of delivery to every assembly plant. When 
organizations align themselves with the common goal of reducing wastes, the 
company profits. 
3 Management and labor need to implicitly tmst each other and give the opportunity to 
succeed to the operators on the floor coached by management on waste reduction 
techniques. 
This last point allows true empowerment of the operator to imprcwe quality of the vehicle, 
and of their working conditions. ~\ good thing about tmst is that is grows, and once this 
system is put in place it gives people the chance to become as good as they can. It also 
encourages then to find better ways to get their work done while improving quality and costs 
to Ford Motor Company. Basically, people don't want to fail, so why not give them the 
opportunity to succeed? 
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The main key points to gain from The Process to Sustain Success are to provide a leyel 
schedule for production and suppliers, standardized work clements, continuous imprm'ement 
through observation and experimentation (struchlred problem solving), which \vill improve 
customer satisfaction, and hence increase profits. 
Cnfortunately, the Way Forward Plan with its circular loop (please refer to Figure 1) doesn't 
point to an objective, which, in this case is Profitability. The Way Forward rests on the 
principles of Bold Leadership, Competitive Cost and Capacity, Clear Pricing, Great Quality, 
Bold Innm'ative Products, Customer Pocus and Strong Brands. These principles are all 
necessary points, but not targeting the core objective - profitability. 
B. Areas of Future Study: 
The Process to Sustained Success focused on the high-level application of setting up or 
revising a complete enterprise such as Ford Motor Company into a lean production system. 
Future research into the specific lean manufacturing tools for each process step should be 
pursued to give better operational direction and standardization. 
l\fanagement and labor relations playa major role on the impact to a manufacturing facility 
and the de\'elopment of a lean enterprise. J ,abor i, critical to the success of implementing 
lean principles. How labor accepts accountability for efficiency and quality improvements in 
a union shop is determined on the le\'el of trust. This trust must be given and fostered in a 
learning environment. 
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Supplier relations concerning their quality and cost improvements would be a great area for 
further study. Again, there must be a trust benveen assembler and supplier to understand 
each other's businesses making sure that one or the other isn't going to get into financial or 
quality difficulties. One cannot survive without the other. Reducing wastes and controlling 
costs are \~ital for both to survive, and the assembler can't forget that point. 
Lastly, the study and improvement of the interaction benveen Marketing and Sales and the 
dealership nenvorks to provide a better understanding of customer needs and wants versus 
manufacturing capabilities to further imprO\'e a "Pull" system and challenge the production 
system in flexibility and level schedule. Again, it all starts with the customer, and by trying to 
meet customer demand without producing excessive inventories for dealers allows both the 
dealership and automotive company to thrive. 
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Glossary of Lean Manufacturing Terms 
Following is a short list of terms often used in explaining lean manufacturing techniques. 
Cellular Manufacturing - linking of manual and machine operations into the most 
efficient combination to maximize value-added activities while minimizing wastc. "\ cell 
layout is typically C -shaped and utilizes one-picce flow. 
Kanban System - a pull system that uses color-coded cards attached to parts or part 
containers to regulate the upstream production and delivery flow. 
Lean Manufacturing - the process of analyzing the flow of information and materials in 
a manufacturing enyironment and continuously improving the process to achie,-e 
enhanced value to the customer. 
Non-Value Added - Any activity that does not add market form or function or is not 
necessary. (l'hese activities should be eliminated, simplified, reduced or integrated.) 
Pull System - method of controlling the flow of resources by replacing only \vhat has 
been consumed. A pull system relies on customer demand. 
Push System - resources are provided to the consumer based on forecasts or schedules. 
(Lean manufacturing encourages the elimination of push systems.) 
Takt Time - customer demand rate. Takt time sets the pace of production to match the 
rate of customer demand and becomes the heartbeat of any lean system. It is calculated 
by taking the work time available and dividing it by the number of units sold. 
Value Added - Any activity that increases the market form or function of the product or 
service. (l'hese are things the customer is willing to pay for.) 
Value Engineering - Improves the product by designing or redesigning to maintain 
quality while reducing manufacturing costs. 
Judgment Inspection - Inspection based on a "post-mortem" of quality defects 
discovered at final inspection distinguishing defective from non-defective products. 
Informative Inspection - Informs processing whenever a defect is discovered at the 
point of origin so that steps can be taken to correct the processing method or condition 
and preyent recurrence. 
IL VS (In Line Vehicle Sequencing) - Sequential Part Delivery or SPD is the process 
of delivering automotive parts to an assembly plant in the exact order or sequence in 
which the vehicles that need them are coming down the production line. 
MODAPTS - l\IODulat "\ttangetnent of Predetermined Time Standards is a 
predetermined time system used for: 
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• Calculating reliable production standards, 
• Improving an organization's productivity, 
• Analyzing departmental efficiency, and 
• Improving employee relations. 
KAIZEN - Continuous incremental improvement in the production process. 
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Appendix A 
Ford Motor Company Historical Timeline: 
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Appendix B 
Announcement of the The Way Forward Plan: 
DEARBORN, Mich., Jan. 23, 2006 - Ford Motor Company [NYSE: F] today announced 
details of a comprehensive plan to restore profitability to its automotive business in North 
Ametlca no later than 2008. h)rd will apply lessons learned from consumers and the 
company's successes around the world to strengthen its Ford, Lincoln and :Mercury brands 
and deliver more innovative products while simultaneously reducing costs and improving 
quality and productivity. 
"The automoti\Te market in North .\merica is rapidly becoming as crowded and fragmented 
as other global markets," said Bill Ford, chairman and CEO. "To meet this challenge, we are 
acting with speed to strengthen the Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brands, deliver the innovation 
customers demand and create a business stmcture for us to compete - and win - in this era 
of global competition. 
"'We will be making painful sacrifices to protect Ford"s heritage and secure our future," he 
added. "Going forward, we will be able to deliver more innovative products, better returns 
for our shareholders and stability in the communities where we operate." 
Ford Around the World - 2006 Outlook 
For 2006, the company is expecting another year of profitability from automotive operations 
outside of North America. PreTtax profits, excluding special items, are expected from 
automotive operations in South America, Europe (Ford of Europe and Premier ~\utomotive 
Group), AsiaTPacific and i\frica, and from I\lazda and Associated Operations. North 
Ametlcan automotive operations arc expected to be unprofitable. O\Terall, Ford's global 
automotive operations are expected to have preTtax losses in 2006, while Ford :Motor Credit 
is expected to achieye preTtax profits. 
The underlying assumptions behind this outlook include: fullTyear industry \Tolumes of 17 
million units in the U.S. and 17.3 million units in Europe; industry net pricing that is expected 
to be down slightly in the U.S. and Europe. Also, the company's quality performance is 
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expected to improve, market share is expected to stabilize or improve in all regions, and cost 
performance is expected to be favorable. Capital expenditures of approximately $7 billion 
arc expected during 20()6, while the company expects its year-end cash balance to be more 
than $20 billion. 
Beyond the above expectatlOns, the company is providing no other guidance about its 
financial performance for 2006 - to keep employees and investors focused on one goal: 
sustainable profitability over time in all regions. 
"'We must be guided by our long-term goals of building our brands, satisfying customers, 
developing strong products, accelerating innovation, and, most importantly, producing a 
sustainable profit from our automotive business," said Bill hlrd. 
Ford in North America - the Way Forward 
Ford's automotive business in North America was profitable in 2003 and 2004, thanks to the 
product investments and cost reductions dri,-en by the company's Revitalization Plan, 
announced in 2002. 
Since that time, more and stronger competition 111 all segments, a faster-than-expected 
customer shift from traditional SCV s into other segments, significantly higher material and 
energy costs and other factors have resulted in lower market share and higher costs for the 
company. 
"The team in North "\merica, led by Mark Fields and supported by ,\nne Stevens, deYeloped 
the plan for North ,\merica, drawing on their extensive global experience in ,\sia, Europe 
and The i\mericas. 'l'hey have reenergized the Ford team to make it work, and they have the 
full support of the hlrd Motor Company behind them," said Jim Padilla, president and chief 
operating officer. 
Flc1ds, executive \'ICe president and president, The ,\mericas, calls the plan the "Way 
Forward." It touches every piece of the North "\merican business to make it more customer-
focused, product -dri,-cn and efficient, including: 
1 ~lore clarity for the I ;'ord, l,incoln and ~Iercury brands -- with a sharper focus on the 
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customer and a clear point of view that will appeal to more buyers than today. 
2 A renewed commitment to design, safety and technology innovation to differentiate 
Ford Motor Company and its products in the marketplace. 
3 New product investments - utilizing Ford's global architectures and scale - to deliver 
more new products faster, including more crossovers, hybrid vehicles, new small cars, 
increased spending on Pord's truck leadership and new "white space" products. 
4 l\1aterial cost reductions of at least $6 billion by 2010. 
5 Continued straightforward pricing that is clear, credible and simple, which will further 
improve residual values. 
6 i\ lean and flexible manufacturing system combined with capaclty matched to 
demand. Capacity will be reduced by 1.2 million units or 26 percent by 200S, 
representing the majority of actions within the plan's 2006-2012 period. 
7 Plant-related employment is reduced by 25,000-30,000 people in the 2006-2012 time 
period, in addition to salaried personnel reductions and a reduction in the company's 
officer ranks. 
Stronger Ford, Lincoln and Mercury Brands 
Ford kicked off the Way Forward plan in October with a comprehensive analysis of 
consumer attitudes and values in the U.S. automotive market. The goal was to develop a 
laser-like focus on different customer targets for hm.I, Lincoln and f"rercury to guide each 
brand's design, engineering and marketing decisions. 
"One of the most important findings from this research is that Americans really do want to 
buy "\merican brands, as long as they are competitive with the imports," said helds. "We 
know this, because it's already working in some segments today, such as the success of the 
new Ford Fusion in the import-dominated midsize car market. 
"Of all the leading automakers, we believe Ford is ,\merica's Car Company because of \vhere 
we've been. In terms of economic and social influence, there is no other company that's had 
a greater impact on the lives of people in the U.S. and in the 20th century than Ford." 
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Customers identify with Ford and its uniquely American story, the research also revealed. 
"The challenge going forward is to give our customers" employees, retirees, dealers, suppliers 
and investors a reason to believe in Ford. That is going to be our focus," Fields said. "Our 
\Vay Forward is not a retreat into smaller markets, but a retaking of the 1 \merican 
marketplace. It's time to play offense. It's time to fight back. 
"\Xle will compete vigorously to be .\merica's Car Company, winning the hearts and tninds of 
even more customers," he added. "We will maintain our commitment to our loyal truck 
customers, while delivering innovative and boldly styled cars, crossovers, SLTV s and other all-
new products that will appeal to people who are still inspired by the ;\merican dream." 
With that clear point of view in the marketplace, Ford is investing in new products for rord, 
Lincoln and Mercury. 
The investment includes moving forward with the company's plan to offer hybrid technology 
on half of the company's Ford, Mercury and Lincoln nameplates in the U.S. 
Today, the company is announcing that hybrid versions of the Ford Five Hundred, Mercury 
Montego, Ford Edge and Lincoln 1\IKX will debut in the 2008-2010 timeframe. The new 
hybrids will join the Ford Escape and Mercury Mariner hybrids, which are on sale today, as 
well as the rord Fusion and Mercury 1\I11an hybrids, which will debut in 2008. Overall, Ford 
Motor Company plans to build 250,000 hybrids a year by 2010. 
Ford also is announcing that it will introduce new "white space" products to reach customers 
in new segments, and accelerate plans to bring even more crossover vehicles and new small 
cars to market. l\t the same time, the company announced that it is increasing its product 
investment in Ford F-Series truck leadership; increasing momentum on its blockbuster cars 
today, such as the Ford Fusion and Ford l\Iustang; introducing more design innovations ~ for 
more "at a glance" sheet metal changes ~ and introducing more safety innovations 
throughout its North" \merican lineup. 
"'With more focused brands, new product investment and innovation, Ford will slow the rate 
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of loss and then stabilize our IT.S. market share in the ncar term, eyen as competitors add 
new models," riclds said. "From there, we can set our sights on the future." 
The Ford Brand: Tn the past, the Ford brand has demonstrated a clear customer focus in 
many - but not all- sq.,>tIlents. Going forward, the Ford brand will build upon the success of 
hits, such as the Ford F-Series, Explorer, Expedition, l\Iustang, Escape and Fusion, and enter 
new segments with a clear, consistent and distinct point of view - one drin:n by bold, 
i\merican design and innovation. The 2007 h>rd Edge, which goes on sale later this year, 
embodies that spirit. 
"'We know how to play offense and play to win," Fields said. "Our plan \vill deliver more 
products - from small cars to our largest trucks - that are unmistakably Fords." 
Ford remams committed to ma1t1tammg leadership in full-size pickup trucks with the F-
Series. The company also plans to continue its momentum in midsize cars - with all-whecl-
drive and hybrid derivatives coming for the hml hlsion - and developing new small cars 
and even more crossovers for the Ford brand. 
l\lercury: Ford is recomnuttl11g itself to Mercury and has developed more focused 
positioning that is a refinement of the work already done to revitalize the brand. 
The newest Mercury products - the Milan, the Mariner and the Mariner Hybrid - are 
artracting younger customers to the brand and more women than Ford-brand products in the 
same segments, Fields said. In addition, they are bringing new customers to Ford Motor 
Company - at conquest rates as high as 50 percent. 
". rhe attraction of Mercury is modern, expressive design - one that is differentiated from 
Ford vehicles. Our l\lercury target customer is not looking for product functionality that is 
substantially different from Ford \'ehicles. But they do have different attitudes and values, 
and they want a product that visually communicates that distinctiveness. 
"Going forward, we will be more aggressive m appealing to these customers with clear, 
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modern differentiation in the design of l\Iercurys, a uruque purchase expenence and 
marketing that is targeted, personalized and interactive," Fields said. 
Lincoln: Ford's vision for the Lincoln brand is to make Lincoln the reward for consumers 
who are living the American dream. The company sees Lincoln becoming the largest volume 
contributor to the Lincoln Mercury business. 
"Lincoln customers don't need to shout about success. They are self-made people with 
enough confidence to be elegant and understated," Fields said. "That understanding of the 
Lincoln customers will drive our brand and product decisions going forward." 
The 2006 Lincoln Zephyr, the brand's first entry-luxury car, and the 2007 Lincoln J\UC,,'{, the 
brand's first crossover, are significant first steps. Going forward, the company plans to give 
Lincoln vehicles an even clearer point of view through their powertrains, unique comfort and 
convenience features and unique designs. 
"Lincoln is about American luxury. There are many customers in this country living the 
American dream and who would prefer to drive ,\merica's luxury car. That is where we are 
headed," he added. 
Straightforward Pricing: Ford is accelerating the clear-and-simple pncmg strategy that 
began with the introduction of the Ford Fusion and Ford Mustang. Ford plans to reduce the 
MSRP of its products and dramatically reduce and cap rebates as it introduces new products. 
"We started introducing clear pricing two years ago. The success of Mustang and Fusion 
proves that it works," Fields said. "We \vill bring sticker prices more in line with actual 
transaction prices and cap 'cash on the hood' rebates as we introduce new cars and trucks 
into the marketplace. It will protect our margins and consumers, too, through higher resale 
values." 
Ford also will increase its product advertising, focusmg on brand characteristics based on 
innovative designs, features and customer benefits. 
- 83 -
Investment-Efficient Product Creation 
Ford has committed to return its North "\merican automotive business to profitability no 
later than 2008. Over time, the Way hmvard plan should deli,-er profitability throughout the 
lineup - including new small cars - by achieving significant material cost savings as well as 
quality and productivity improvements. 
Several new initiatives will bolster ongoing work that already is yielding sit,mificant operating 
improvements. Specifically: 
1 Ford will use more global ,-ehicle architectures in North "\merica, particularly for cars 
and crossovers, to reduce investment spending and improve quality. 
2 The company will share more parts and systems that are invisible to the customer, 
such as brakes, suspension and underbody components, across its North American, 
European and Asian brands to leverage its global purchasing power for lower costs 
and better quality. 
3 Ford will continue to implement its Global Product Development System - which is 
based, in part, on l\fazda's highly successful and efficient model - to reduce product 
development times by six to 12 months, depending on the size of the program. 
4 Ford will continue to invest in lean and flexible manufacturing, with 75 percent of its 
North American assembly capacity being "flexible" by the end of 2008. 
Improved quality will be achieved, in part, through the "Aligned Business Framework" 
agreements with select strategic suppliers. The agreements are designed to strengthen 
collaboration and create a more sustainable business model for both Ford and its key 
suppliers to improve mutual profitability. 
The i\ligned Business Framework - coupled with Ford's "Commodity Business Plan" 
process and a new single-team approach to product de,-elopment and purchasing - \vill 
deliver improved quality and drive technology inno\":1tions to Ford, while lowering costs. 
"We are committed to developing strong relationships with a select group of more capable, 
more financially stable strategic suppliers on a long-term basis," said Anne Stevens, executive 
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vlce president and chief operating officer, The Americas. "Strong suppliers and proycn 
processes that everyone sticks to religiously go hand in hand with delivering innovation, 
quality and lower costs." 
Smaller, Nimbler Organization 
Achieving a lean fixed-cost structure and significantly improving Ford's North American 
assembly capacity utilization are critical components of the Way Forward plan. 
"'We're now well past the point in which one or hvo hit products can correct the overcapacity 
we have or justify the stafflng levels we maintain - even with the significant actions we've 
taken during the past couple of years," Stevens said. "Sadly, this isn't just a Ford issue. It's 
an issue for our domestic competitors, as well. 
"As hard and painful as it is to idle plants and reduce our work force, we know these 
sacrifices are critical to set the stage for a stronger future," she added. 
Ford is taking the following new actions to align its capacity with expected demand and to 
reduce fixed costs: 
1 14 manufacturing facilities will be idled and cease production by 2012, including a 
total of seven vehicle assembly plants. 
2 Assembly capacity will be reduced by 1.2 million units or 26 percent by the end of 
2008. 
3 A new low-cost manufacturing site is planned f,:)r the future. 
Ford will idle the following facilities through 2008: 
St. I,ouis Assembly 
2 Atlanta Assembly 
3 Wixom l\ssembly 
4 Batavia Transmission 
5 Windsor Casting (announced following CAW contract negotiations in 2(05) 
6 Two additional assembly plants, which will be determined later this year 
In addition, production at St. Thomas ,\ssembly will be reduced to one shift. Facilities 
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operated by Automotive Components Holding LLC are not included 111 the new 
announcement. 
~All of these actions will reduce total North ,\merican employment by 25,0()O-30,O()() people 
in the 2006-2012 time period. This is in addition to the previously announced reduction of 
the equivalent of 4,000 salaried positions in the first quarter of 2006 - or 10 percent of salary-
related costs - and a reduction in the company's officer ranks by 12 percent by the end of the 
first quarter. 
Ford has briefed the leadership of the L' i\ W and CAW about these plans. 
Financial Impact 
2006 will be a vear of transition as Ford moves from its old North l\merican business model 
to a new customer-focused strategy that is designed to restore automotive operations in the 
region to profitability no later than 2008. The estimated pre-tax financial impact of the 
North American plan in 2006 includes: 
$250 million for hourly personnel separations - excluding L\CH actions. 
$220 million for fixed asset write-offs. 
"Our cost structure will improve as we progress through 2006 and increasingly thereafter, 
and we'll return to profitability in our North L\merican automotive business no later than 
2008," said Don Leclair, executive \-ice president and chief financial officer. "We're 
confident in our plan and optimistic \ve can achie\-e our goals." 
Summary 
rord begins a new era in its North American automotive business with a realistic view of the 
challenges facing the company but also building on several important competitive strengths, 
including: 
1 A corporate commitment to design, safety and technology innovation. 
2 Leadership in full-size pickup trucks, where the Ford F-Series has been No.1 for 29 
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years. 
3 ,\ resurgent car business, paced by the Ford l\Iustang and Fusion, the Mercury l\Iilan 
and the Lincoln Zephyr. 
4 A strong and growing presence in crossover utility vehicles, todav's fastest-growing 
segment. 
S Ford Credit, which continues to be closely linked to Ford's automotl\oe business, 
delivering solid profitability. 
6 More than 4,300 Ford and J jncoln Mercury dealerships. 
"Ford's strengths were built over 1 00 years, and we are taking the tough but necessary steps 
to address our issues with candor, speed and compassion for the people affected by our work 
force reductions," said Bill Ford. "This next chapter in Ford's history will be remembered 
for our renewed commitment to innovation and as the time we moved boldly to prepare 
Ford's North i\merican business to face global competition." 
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Appendix C 
l~he Global 8 D System: 
Background 
In February, 1995, a cross-organizational steering committee was formed to develop a best 
practice problem solving process and computerized system that merged differences between 
organizational approaches to solving problems (TOPS, EQUIP TOPS, Prevent Recurrence 
and others). The corporate-wide process and supporting system was to be made available to 
Ford employees and suppliers and provide a common source of lessons learned. The original 
Global 8D software system that came of this effort was a Windows-based client/server 
program. In late 1998, a companion web application was created to be run over the Ford 
intranet. With the continued focus on web technologies, the client/server system was 
decomissioned at the end of 2000 and the Global 8D on the Web application is now the 
single-source for working with 80s within I'ord. 
Our Vision 
The vision of Global 80 is to implement a common, enhanced, worldwide 80 problem-
solving process for Ford Motor Company and its suppliers. 
Our Mission 
The mission of Global 8D is to provide a common process; which effectively defines and 
resolves concerns and prevents their recurrence. Also: 
1 Increase management understanding 
2 Improve concern resolution and prevention 
3 Improve performance to Quality/Cost/Timing 
4 Promote frank and open problem solving 
5 Provide automated computer support 
DO - Prepare for the Ford Global 80 Process 
Purpose: 
In response to a symptom, evaluate the need for the G8D process. If necessary, provide an 
Emergency Response Action to protect the customer and initiate the G80 process. 
G8D Application Criteria: 
1 The symptom(s) has been defined and quantified. 
2 The G8D customer(s) who experienced the symptom(s), and the affected parties, 
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when appropriate, have been identified. 
3 Measurements taken to quantify the symptom(s) demonstrate that a performance gap 
exists [\ND lOR priority (severity, urgency, growth) of the symptom warrants 
initiation of the process. 
4 The cause is unknown. 
5 t"vIanagement is committed to dedicate necessary resources to fix the problem at the 
root cause level and to prevent recurrence. 
6 Symptom complexity exceeds the ability of one person to resolve 
D1 - Establish Team 
Purpose: 
Establish a small group of people with the process and/ or product knowledge, allocated 
time, authority, and skill in the required technical disciplines to solve the problem and 
implement corrective actions. The group must have a designated Champion and Team 
Leader. The group begins the team building process. 
02 - Describe the Problem 
Purpose: 
Describe the internal/ external customer Problem by identifying "what is wrong with what" 
and detail the Problem in quantifiable terms. 
03 - Develop Interim Containment Action (ICA) 
Purpose: 
Defme, verify, and implement the Interim Containment Action (TeA) to isolate effects of the 
problem from any internal/ external customer until Permanent Corrective l\ctions (PC\s) are 
implemented. Validate the effectiveness of the containment actions. 
04 - Define and Verify Root Cause and Escape Point 
Purpose: 
Isolate and verify the Root Cause by testing each possible cause against the problem 
description and test data. Also isolate and verify the place in the process where the effect of 
the Root Cause should have been detected and contained (Escape Point). 
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05 - Choose and Verify Permanent Corrective Actions (PCAs) for 
Root Cause and Escape Point 
Purpose: 
Select the best Permanent Corrective Action to remove the Root Cause. ,\lso select the best 
Permanent Corrective Action to eliminate Escape. Verifr that both decisions will be 
successful when implemented without causing undesirable effects. 
D6 - Implement and Validate Permanent Corrective Actions (PCAs) 
Purpose: 
Plan and implement selected Permanent Corrective ,\ctions. Remove the Interim 
Containment Action. Monitor the long-term results. 
D7 - Prevent Recurrence 
Purpose: 
l'v[odify the necessary systems including policies, practices, and procedures to Prevent 
Recurrence of this problem and similar ones. Make Recommendations for systemic 
improvements, as necessary. 
D8 - Recognize Team and Individual Contributions 
Purpose: 




Ford Motor Company 2005 Full Year Financials 
Today Ford Motor Company is announcing its third consecutive year of profitability. Full-
year 2005 net income was $2 billion, or $1.04 per share, and fourth-quarter net income was 
$124 million, or 8 cents per share. 
Full-year pre-tax profits, from continuing operations, excluding special items, totaled $3.4 
billion. On the same basis, the Automoti\'e sector lost $1 billion. Within this, South 
America, Europe and Asia Pacific were profitable. These profits were more than offset by 
losses in North America. Premier L\utomotive Group lost $100 million, sharply improved 
from 2004. Financial Services reported a pre-tax profit of $4.4 billion. 
A press release containing more details about our fourth-quarter and full-year results 1S 
attached. 
### 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY REPORTS 2005 NET INCOME OF 
$2 BILLION, PROFITABLE FOR THIRD CONSECUTIVE YEAR 
o Third consecutive year of profitability. Full-year net income of $2 billion, or $1.04 per share. 
o Full-year earnings from continuing operations of $1.28 per share or $2.5 billion after tax, 
excluding special items. 
o Excluding special items, South L\merica, Europe and ~\sia Pacific were all profitable, but these 
profits were more than offset by losses in North :\merica. Premier l\utomotive Group 
continued to incur losses, but these were substantially reduced from 2004 levels. 
o hnancial Services, including Ford Motor Credit, reported strong results. 
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DE1\RBORN, I\fich., Jan. 23,2006 - Ford t-vlotor Company lNYSE: FI today reported 2005 
full-year net income of $2 billion, or $1.04 per share. In 2004, the company reported net 
income of $3.5 billion, or $1.73 per share. 
Excluding speClal items, l'ord's 2005 full-year after-tax income from continuing operations 
totaled $2.5 billion, or $1.28 per share. This compares with year-ago earnings from 
continuing operations of $4.3 billion, or $2.11 per share, excluding special items. 
Full-year sales and revenue for 2005 was $178.1 billion, up from $171.7 billion a year ago. 
"We accomplished many things in 2005, including the successful launch of the new Ford 
Fusion, Mercury J\filan and Lincoln Zephyr, introduction of the company's new innovation 
initiative, completion of the sale of Hertz, and an agreement with the LT A W to help reduce 
rising health care costs," said Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Bill Ford. "Excluding 
North America, our automotive operations made great progress in 2005; we must keep 
\\ orking to improve our business in each and every region." 
Special items reduced earnings by 6 cents per share in the fourth quarter. The pre-tax effect 
of these items includes: a charge of $1.3 billion for impairment of Jaguar and Land Rover 
fixed assets; personnel reduction actions of $962 million; and the sale of The Hertz 
Corporation for a total profit of $1.5 billion, $1.4 billion of which was recorded in the fourth 
quarter. In addition, the company's repatriation of foreign earnings pursuant to the 
j\merican .lobs Creation ~\ct of 2004 resulted in a permanent tax savings of about $250 
million. Largely as a result of these factors and costs associated with Visteon-related 
restructuring, special items reduced full-year income by 15 cents per share. hnally, full-year 
net income from continuing operations was reduced by 9 cents primarily for a cumulative 




Ford Motor Company full-year highlights include: 
o Launch of corporate innm'ation initiative, including a commitment to a ten-fold 
increase in hybrid production by 2010. 
o Introduction of initiative to improve collaboration with select global suppliers of 
key components and consolidate our supply base. 
o Sale of The Hertz Corporation, with proceeds of $5.6 billion. 
o hnalization of Visteon agreement, which included the creation of a Ford-managed, 
temporary business entity named ,\utomotive Components Holdings, LLC. This 
entity took ownership from Visteon of 17 plants and six offices, research centers and 
other facilities. This arrangement protects the supply of components to Ford plants, 
improves the competitiveness of Ford's supply base, and will reduce Ford's costs over 
time. 
o Cessation of assembly operations at Jaguar's Browns Lane facility and consolidation 
of its assembly operations at Castle Bromwich and closure of I"ord's Lorain Assembly 
plant in J ,orain, Ohio. 
o Reduction of total automotive personnel by more than 10,000 during 2005, through 
personnel reduction actions and attrition. 
o Ratification of an agreement \vith the United ,\uto Workers (subject to court 
approval) to reduce the company's health care costs primarily through modifications to 
the hourly retiree health care plan. These actions are expected to reduce Ford's overall 
retiree health care and life insurance (OPEB) obligation by $5 billion, with a projected 
annual cost savings of about $650 million on a pre-tax basis. 
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D Establishment of a company contribution limit set at 2006 levels for health care 
benefits and a reduction of life insurance benefits for l'.S. salaried retirees. These 
actions reduced ford's overall retiree health care and life insurance (OPE B) obligation 
by about $3 billion, with a projected annual cost savings of about $400 million on a 
pre-tax basis. 
FOURTH QUARTER 
In the fourth quarter, the company reported net income of $124 million, or 8 cents per share. 
This compares with fourth quarter net income of$104 million, or 6 cents per share, in 2004. 
Excluding special items, fourth quarter after-tax income from continuing operations totaled 
$511 million, or 26 cents per share, compared to $554 million, or 28 cents per share, a year 
ago. 
Total sales and revenue in the fourth quarter were $47.6 billion, compared to $44.9 billion in 
the year-ago period. 
[ 
Thefollo}j}in.~ dZ:l'atJJion o/the re.m/tJ %ur 'lutol1lotit'e Jedor and .'1utol1lotiz!e btlJineJJ unih iJ on a 
fire-tax baJiJ that exdudeJ Jpeiia! item.'. See tab!ejo!!o2}!if~Z "Safe f {arbor/ Ri.l'k 1-'adorJ"jor the nature and Ilmount 
o/!lieJc Jpeiial itemJ and a remndlia!ion to GA'1P. 
AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 
For the full year, Ford's worldwide Automotive sector reported a pre-tax loss of $1 billion, 
compared with pre-tax profit of $850 million a year ago. The decline primarily reflected 
unfavorable cost performance, volume and mix, and exchange, partially offset by net pricing. 
For the fourth quarter, r"ord's worldwide ~Automotive sector reported a pre-tax loss of $12 
million, an improvement of $458 million from a pre-tax loss of $470 million a year earlier. 
The improvement primarily reflected favorable volume and mix, net pricing, cost 
performance and exchange. 
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\X'orldwide automotive revenue for 2005 was $154.5 billion, an improvement from revenue 
of$147.1 billion a year ago. Total fourth-quarter automotive revenue was $41.8 billion, an 
increase of $3 billion from a year ago. 
Total company vehicle unit sales in 2005 were 6,818,000, an increase of 20,000 units from 
2004. Fourth-quarter vehicle unit sales totaled 1,853,000, an increase of 102,000 units from a 
year ago. 
Automotive cash at Dec. 31, 2005, totaled $25.1 billion of cash, marketable securities, loaned 
securities and short-term Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA) assets. 
THE AMERICAS 
The Americas reported a 2005 full-year pre-tax loss of $1.2 billion, compared to a pre-tax 
profit of $1.6 billion a year ago. For the fourth quarter, the Americas had a pre-tax loss of 
$15 million, an improvement of $411 million compared to a pre-tax loss of $426 million a 
year earlier. 
North America: For 2005, Ford's North America automotive operations reported a pre-tax 
loss of $1.6 billion, a decline of $3 billion from 2004. The decline primarily reflected 
unfavorable cost performance, lower V.S. market share, lower dealer inventories and adverse 
exchange. For the year, North America's sales totaled $81.4 billion, compared with $83 
billion a year earlier. 
For the fourth quarter, North America automotive operations reported a pre-tax loss of$143 
million, compared to a pre-tax loss of $470 million in 2004. The imprmTement primarily 
reflected cost reductions and favorable net pricing, partially offset by operating losses 
incurred by the former Visteon activities now controlled by Ford. Fourth-quarter sales were 
$22.1 billion, compared with $21.1 billion in 2004. 
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South America: Ford's South America automotive operations reported a pre-tax profit of 
$3R9 million, an increase of $249 million from a 2004 pre-tax profit of $140 million. The 
improvement primarily reflected net pricing and favorable volume, as well as a stronger 
Brazilian currency. Full-year sales improved to $4.4 billion from $3 billion in 2004. 
In the fourth quarter, Ford's South America automotive operations posted a pre-tax profit of 
$[28 million, an improvement of $84 million, compared with a pre-tax profit of $44 million 
in 2004. The improvement primarily reflected favorable net pricing and exchange. Fuurrh-
quarter sales were $1.3 billion, an impron:ment from $899 million a year ago. 
FORD EUROPE AND PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP (PAG) 
The combined 2005 full-year pre-tax profit for Ford Europe and P,\G was $36 million. This 
compares with a loss of $626 million for 20()4. For the fourth quarter, Ford J<:urope and 
PAG had a combined pre-tax profit of$112 million, an improvement from a pre-tax loss of 
$324 million a year ago. 
Ford Europe: Ford Europe posted a full-year pre-tax profit of$136 million, compared with 
a pre-tax profit of $114 million a year ago. The improvement primarily reflected favorable 
cost performance and exchange, partially offset by unfavorable net pricing and mix. Sales for 
the year totaled $30.2 billion, compared to $26.5 billion in 2004. 
For the fourth quarter, Ford Europe reported a pre-tax profit of $66 million, an 
improvement from a pre-tax loss of $69 million a year ago. The improvement primarily 
reflected favorable cost performance and higher profits at our operations in Turkey, partially 
offset by unfavorable product mix. Fourth-quarter sales totaled $8.2 billion, compared to 
$7.4 billion a year ago. 
Premier Automotive Group: I;or 2005, PAG reported a full-year pre-tax loss of$l()O 
million, an improvement from a pre-tax loss of $740 million a year ago. The improvement 
primarily reflected the impact of new products, primarily at J ~and Rover, that resulted in a 
richer mix and improved net pricing. Full-year sales for the group totaled $30.3 billion, 
compared to $27.6 billion in 2004. 
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In the fourth quarter, PAG reported a pre-tax profit of $46 million, an improvement of $301 
million, compared with a pre-tax loss of $255 million in the year-ago period. The year-over-
year improvement primarily reflected the impact of new Land Rover products, resulting in a 
richer mix and improved net pricing. Fourth-quarter sales totaled $8 billion, compared to 
$7.8 billion a year ago. 
ASIA PACIFIC AND AFRICA/MAZDA 
For the full year, Asia Pacific and ,Urica/Mazda reported a pre-tax profit of $316 million, 
compared with a pre-tax profit of $163 million a year ago. In the fourth quarter, Asia Pacific 
and Africa/l\Iazda reported a pre-tax loss of $7 million, compared with a pre-tax loss of $22 
million in 2004. 
Asia Pacific and Africa: For full-year 2005, Asia Pacific and Africa reported a pre-tax profit 
of$61 million, an improvement of$16 million when compared with the year ago period. 
The improvement primarily reflected favorable exchange and higher volume, which was 
partially offset by unfavorable vehicle mix and higher costs. full-year sales totaled $7.7 
b:illion, an increase from $7 billion in 2004. 
For the fourth quarter, Asia Pacific and Africa reported a pre-tax loss of $39 million, 
compared with a pre-tax loss of $13 million in the year-ago period. The decline primarily 
reflected deterioration of results in Ford ~\ustralia due to lower \"olumes and unfavorable 
mix. fourth-quarter sales totaled $1.8 billion, compared to $1.6 billion in 2004. 
Mazda: For full-year 2005, Ford's share of the pre-tax profit of Mazda and associated 
operations was $255 million, compared with $118 million a year ago. h)r the fourth quarter, 
Ford's share of the pre-tax profit of Mazda and associated operations was a pre-tax-profit of 
$,)2 million, compared with a pre-tax loss of $9 million a year ago. The improvement in both 
periods primarily reflected gains in our investment in Mazda's convertible bonds, as well as 
higher operating results at Mazda. 
FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 
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Financial Services Sector results include The Hertz Corporation through Dec. 21, 2005, the 
date on which it was sold. For the full year, excluding special items, Ford's Financial Services 
sector reported a pre-tax profit of $4.4 billion, compared with a pre-tax profit of $5 billion 
last year. 1;or the fourth quarter, excluding special items, the financial Services Sector earned 
a pre-tax profit of $881 million, compared with pre-tax profits of $1 billion a year ago. 
Ford Motor Credit Company: Ford J\fotor Credit reported net income of $2.5 billion in 
2005, down $370 million from a year earlier. On a pre-tax basis from continuing operations, 
Ford l\Iotor Credit earned $3.9 billion in 2005, down $570 million from 2004. 
In the fourth quarter of 2005, ford Motor Credit's net income was $465 million, down $78 
million from a year earlier. On a pre-tax basis from continuing operations, Ford Motor 
Credit earned $737 million in the fourth quarter, compared with $859 million the previous 
year. The decrease in earnings in both fourth-quarter and full-year 2005 primarily reflected 
lower volumes and margins, partially offset by lower credit losses. 
The Hertz Corporation: Hertz reported a full-year 2005 pre-tax profit of $569 million, 
excluding special items, which was a year-(}\Ter-year improvement of $76 million. Hertz 
reported a fourth-quarter pre-tax profit of $121 million, excluding special items, which was 
an increase of $14 million from the same 
period in 2004. 
Ford Motor Company, a global automotive industry leader based in Dearborn, Mich., 
manufactures and distributes automobiles in 200 markets across six continents. With 
about 300,000 employees, the company's core and affiliated automotive brands include 
Aston Martin, Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, Lincoln, Mazda, Mercury and Volvo. Its 
automotive-related services include Ford Motor Credit Company. 
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VITA 
Kenneth "\. Ryan was born B l;ebruary 1968. He graduated from Belleville 
Township High School- West in the spring of 1986 and was selected as a member of the 
National I-Ionor Society. 
After graduating high school, he attended St. Louis L~niversity - Parks Engineering 
School in the fall of 1986 and graduated in 1990 with a Bachelor of Science in "\erospace 
Engineering (BSAE). Expanding his knowledge base, Kenneth enrolled at the University of 
l\[issouri - Columbia in the fall of 1990 graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in 
Mechanical Engineering (BSl\IE) in 1991 on the Dean\ List. 
Kenneth then went to work for Vitek Systems of l\IcDonnell Douglas Corp. in St. 
Louis, MO as a research and development engineer. He left Vitek Systems and entered 
service with the United States i\ir Force commissioned a 2m' LT in l\farch 1992. Selected for 
Flight Training, he went through L'ndergraduate Pilot Training (LWI) flying T-37 Tweets and 
T -38 Talons finishing first in his class. From LTPT, Kenneth was selected to fly ,\ir 
Superiority fighters accumulating time in 1"-15's. In 1995, Lt Ryan moved to Pensacola, 1'1, 
to spend a year in the ,\ir Force / Navy Joint Pilot Exchange Program training in Navy flight 
squadrons accumulating time in F/,\-18's. Capt. Ryan went back to the ,\ir l;orce's 33''' 
Fighter Wing based in Ft. Walton Beach, Fl" and left ,\ctive Duty l\ir Force in 1998. 
Mr. Ryan now works for Ford Motor Company as a Body Construction Engineer 
de\'eloping the 2001 Explorer Sport Trac, the 2002 L'152 Explorer, 2006 li251 Explorer, and 
now is in charge of the door stamping assembly and construction for Ford's 2009 1"-150 
Truck. 
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